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by

Bernadette M. Semple

June 1992

Thesis Advisor:

Claude Buss

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China-African Connection: Implications for United States Foreign Policy

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Over the past 40 years the central theme and organizing principle of global political, military and economic existence has been the East-West conflict. Now with the ending of the Cold War and international economic restructuring, the primary global struggle may very well be transformed into a North-South Conflict. This thesis examines the role of the Peoples Republic of China in Third World affairs and the use of its self-proclaimed "Third World Leader" posture as a mechanism for achieving its own goal of becoming a full-fledged global power by the 21st century. In particular the thesis focuses on China-Africa relations. China views the prospect of a "New World Order" as a threat to the interests of the Third World. Consequently China has embarked upon a diplomatic offensive designed to strengthen political, economic and strategic relations with Africa as well as other Third World nations. With nation states and politico-economic alliances changing faster than many could imagine the PRC-Third World relations especially PRC-African relations deserve focus and attention.

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I. INTRODUCTION

With the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of what was once the Soviet Union, the world is entering a phase of restructuring in international relations. At the forefront is the United States, asserting its role as the dominant player, ushering in what President George Bush has proclaimed to be "The New World Order." It is a new world order that is in essence an international economic order based on democracy and a capitalistic global "free market" economy. Consequently, world events over the last two years have delineated the power centers of a world economy dominated by three competitors—the United States, Japan and the European Community (EC)—each with its own spheres of influence, special interests and special relationships in the Third World.

Left out of this tripolar competition is the Third World, or Developing Nations. China, (which considers itself the leader of the Third World nations) contends that this "new world order" is merely a code word for U.S. hegemony designed to attain an undisputed capacity to set the global agenda on international political issues and facilitate exploitation of the Third World.¹

Over the past 40 years the central theme and organizing principle of global political, military and economic existence has been the East-West conflict. Now, with the collapse of Soviet Union and international economic

¹Zhenhuang, Z., "Building a Just World Order," *Beijing Review*, 12-18 August, 1991, p. 12.

restructuring the primary global struggle may well be transformed into a North-South conflict. Clearly China views the New World Order as a threat to the interests of the Third World. With nation states and politico-economic alliances changing faster than many had ever imagined, PRC-Third World relations, especially PRC-African relations, deserve focused attention and consideration.

Africa is a complex, struggling and unstable region. However, there may be light at the end of the tunnel. In the past year several one-party rulers were toppled. Africa is slowly moving toward democratization. While Africa should not be treated as a single entity chiefly because it is one continental land mass, it is imperative that one recognize that there are over 50 diverse states rich in natural resources. The strengthening of political, economic and strategic relations with Africa as well as with other developing Third World nations is a heady challenge to contemporary Chinese leadership. More importantly, Chinese leadership among the African nations could strain North-South relations and could provide China with the support it needs to become a power broker on such international and regional issues as arms control and regional conflicts.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the People's Republic of China in Third World affairs and the use of its self-proclaimed "Third World leader" posture as a mechanism for achieving its own goal of

becoming a fully fledged global power by the 21st Century. Utilizing a regional approach I have limited my focus to Africa.²

The central hypothesis is that China perceives itself to be the de facto leader of the Third World. As such, the PRC will seek to utilize its leadership position in order to emerge ultimately as a truly global power capable of challenging "Western Supremacy" and thus play a significant role in defining the "New World Order." At the outset the genesis and evolution of Sino-African relations will be examined. The relative depth of China's politico-economic interests on the African continent will be carefully scrutinized. The question will be asked whether the PRC has a genuine ideological interest concerning African development or is PRC concern only part of an agenda designed to coopt Third World nations into developing a New United Front Strategy?

Chapter I examines the mutual interests of China and Africa. It explains feelings of sympathy and reciprocity and uses the Tan-Zam as a case study in the implementation of their respective policies.

Chapter II concentrates on the specific historical, ideological, and geopolitical motives behind the policies pursued by various governments from of Zhou En-Lai through Li Peng (1949-1989). The differences are noted between rhetorical pronouncements and pragmatic compromises. For convenience, the development of Chinese policies is divided into chronological periods: 1949-1952, 1953-1957, 1958-1965, 1966-1969, 1970-1976,

²Africa, although the term in U.S. foreign policy denotes subsaharan Africa, for Chinese foreign policy objectives North Africa will also be included in this study (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia).

and 1977-1989. Within each period, attention will be drawn to the political, economic, military/strategic and ideological concepts involved in the formulation of China's African foreign policy.

Chapter III examines contemporary Sino-African foreign policy, 1990-present, as affected by the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and disintegration of the Soviet Union. These are the key elements in formulating the still vaguely defined "New World Order" and in shaping the Chinese reactions. In a broader fashion, the chapter will examine the goals and objectives of China with respect to the South Commission or Group of 77. The question will be asked whether a new Chinese leadership would be more progressive, or perhaps more reactionary, in the implementation of current policies.

Chapter IV addresses the problems that American policy makers face in dealing with Sino-African relations. Historically, U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has been defined in terms of the East-West conflict.³ Now that the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union and China no longer constitute an ideological monolith, the U.S. must revamp its foreign policy towards Africa. Clearly Africa is conflict-prone. Many of the conflicts are a result of the colonial past with many states seeking autonomy. Consequently some very real political and economic transitions are beginning to take shape that may have far-reaching consequences. It is quite possible that China believes African nations distrustful of the West will seek assistance in economic development and technological knowledge from Asian countries, including

³Kitchen, H., *Some Guidelines on Africa for the Next*, (Washington D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988), p. 1.

China. The thesis concludes addressing the effects of various Chinese-African scenarios on the policies of the United States after examination of different possible alternatives. Recommendations are suggested for policies that may be in the best interests for Africa, for China, and for the United States.

A. GENESIS AND GROWTH OF SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

Some experts contend that Africa does not in fact matter very much to China. For example,

It is hard to make a case that Africa matters very much to China. The 45-odd countries of the continent constitute roughly a quarter of all U.N. members and something like a half of all developing states, but they count for little in the overall scheme of Chinese foreign policy objectives.⁴

However, the fact remains that China and Africa have deeply rooted historical, social and economic ties dating back as early as the First Century B.C. and reinforced by three major factors: race, colonialism and underdevelopment. However, the historical background of relations mattered very little to China until the Cold War, which followed in the aftermath of World War II.

China's interests—its objectives, motivations, and aspirations—have only recently been aroused by the actions of the United States and the former Soviet Union. To assist in understanding the recent development of Sino-African relations, Appendix A contains a time line that begins in 1949 and ends in 1992.

⁴Segal, G, *China and Africa*, annals of the American Academy, Vol 519, January 1992, pp. 115-125, see also Lim, Z., "China's Third World Policy," in *Chinese View of the World*, ed. Hao, Y., and Guocang, H., New York: Pantheon 1989, pp. 250-252.

Before the accession of the communists to power in Beijing the contacts between the Chinese and Africans could be characterized as somewhat remarkable in the sense that although there was significant commercial, technical and nautical exchanges, the Chinese confined themselves to East Africa without attempt or intention to impose influence on the life and destinies of the population. The conduct of the early Chinese can only be fully appreciated when contrasted to the persistent barbarism and exploitive practices of the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Arabs, Persians and subsequent colonial/racist policies of the European powers.⁵

After 1949, considerations of the Third World have been basic to China's foreign policy objectives. For reasons both of ideology and national interest, Africa became the primary component of that Third World policy and held preeminent importance. Africa symbolized the ongoing revolutionary struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Then, China's support for several African states on the quest for self-determination provided instant credibility in the region against "American Imperialism and Soviet Revisionism." Finally, China, in turn, has received the support and recognition of African states.⁶ This special reciprocity is best illustrated by the support of African nations during the U.N. vote in which the PRC displaced Taiwan as "China," in exchange for Chinese subsequent willingness to undertake the building of the Tan-Zam Railway.

⁵Snow, P., *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 1-36.

⁶Yu, G. T., *China's African Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1975, p. 11.

Specific Sino-African relations expanded within the global framework of anti-imperialism and national development in the years before 1974. The world witnessed a great anticolonial movement that impacted on China which was still striving against its colonial period. The number of African states in the United Nations grew from eight in 1959 to 42 in 1974. During these same years both Taiwan and Beijing courted recognition from African states. By 1971, Taiwan had begun normal diplomatic relations with three African nations; Beijing with 26. It was at that juncture that a substantial African vote supported the successful effort of the PRC to regain its seat in the United Nations.⁷

B. TANZANIA-ZAMBIA RAILWAY (TAN-ZAM) A CASE STUDY IN COOPERATION

A consummate watershed event in Sino-African relations was the extraordinary financial commitment undertaken by China in building the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. The Tan-Zam Railway was unquestionably the most important single foreign aid project undertaken to date by the Chinese. The \$400 million, 25-year no interest loan more than doubled its commitment to the region. Adding even greater significance to the undertaking was that the project commenced in 1965 which was at the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Committing itself to a vast project despite a paucity of resources not only enhanced China's credibility but produced political gains in the region and international arena.⁸

⁷Hutchinson, A., *China's Africa Revolution*, London: Western Press, 1975, p. 165.

⁸Yu, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

Perhaps even more significant was that the Chinese built the railway when no one else in the world would. The conception of the railway was born in the British colonial era. Zambia, which gained its independence in 1964, was land-locked between what was then Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese-controlled Mozambiquan port of Beira. By having a rail link between the Zambia copper belt to Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, Zambia would be able to achieve a greater degree of political and economic freedom from then White-ruled Rhodesia and Mozambique.⁹

President Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and President Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) sought support for the project from the West and the British/U.S.-dominated World Bank. They were turned down with the explanation that the railway served "no economic benefit."¹⁰ President Nyerere stated:

It was not as if we had alternate proposals, we should indeed welcome Western offers, but the only firm offer we had was from China.¹¹

China's proposal was accepted immediately by Tanzania. After Zhou En-Lai's 1965 visit to the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam, a 12-man survey team arrived to conduct an engineering survey at the request of President Nyerere. Zambia's full commitment did not come until 1967 after President Kaunda's visit to Beijing.¹²

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 127 and Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹⁰Snow, *op. cit.* p. 151.

¹¹Larkin, B., *China and Africa 1949-1970: Foreign Policy of Peoples Republic of China*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 99-100.

¹²*Ibid.*

The contracts were signed on September 5, 1967 in Beijing by Fang Yi, (Minister of Economic Relations) and the finance ministers of Tanzania and Zambia. Two more rounds of talks followed, to work out the technical aspects of the projects, in Dar es Salaam (1968) and Lusaka (1969). The final agreement was signed in Beijing on July 12, 1970.¹³

The construction of the Tan-Zam Railway (named Tazara) commenced immediately following inauguration ceremonies of the rail link on October 12, 1970. Chinese engineers and construction workers along with Tanzanian trainees began laying railway on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam. Two years later, on August 25, 1973, the Tanzanian portion of Tazara was complete and the Zambia construction began. In September 1975, Tazara was complete, two years ahead of schedule and much to the chagrin of skeptics.

Tazara was a massive project. "It was the longest railway in Africa and the longest railway complete anywhere on the planet since the end of the Second World War."¹⁴ The Chinese-Tanzanian-Zambian workforce (see Table 1) built 300 bridges, six miles of tunnel, 93 railway stations (which when linked up with Zambia rail systems would be expanded to 147), imported 85 mainline diesel locomotives, 17 shunting locomotives, 2100 freight wagons and 100 coaches.¹⁵ In addition, China also developed training schools for

¹³Yu, George T. "The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Aid to Africa," in *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, edited by Warren Weinstein and Thomas Henricksen (New York: Praeger), 1984, p. 125.

¹⁴Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

¹⁵ Yu, *op. cit.*, p. 137, and Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

Zambians and Tanzanians in Dar es Salaam as well as shipped trainees to China to attend the Northern China Communications University.¹⁶

TABLE 1. TAZARA FORCE FORCE, 1972-74

NATIONALITY	NUMBER OF WORKERS	PERCENTAGE
Chinese	13,500	26
Tanzanians	35,900	70
Zambians	2,100	4
Total	51,500	100

1973

NATIONALITY	NUMBER OF WORKERS	PERCENTAGE
Chinese	12,000	26
Tanzanians	23,400	51
Zambians	10,800	23
Total	46,200	100

1974

NATIONALITY	NUMBER OF WORKERS	PERCENTAGE
Chinese	11,500	30
Tanzanians	13,600	36
Zambians	13,000	34
Total	38,100	100

(Source: Adapted from Yu, George T. "The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Aid to Africa," in *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, edited by Warren Weinstein and Thomas Henricksen (New York: Praeger), 1984, p. 125.

Upon completion of Tazara the Chinese workforce returned to China immediately. The Chinese fully intended to leave Tazara operations to the complete autonomy of Tanzania and Zambia. Unfortunately, Tanzania and Zambia did not have the technical know-how to run such an extensive

¹⁶Ibid.

operation and problems developed. Consequently, after a tripartite meeting in 1978, China agreed not to withdraw the technical expertise and to continue to provide for training.

There are several reasons why the Tanzam Railway can be considered especially significant in the evolution of Sino-African relations. First, until this undertaking, Chinese support was considered to be more symbolic than material. Second, completion of the railway provided psychological invigoration for both Chinese and Africans by demonstrating technological prowess, energy and politico/economic largesse. Third, the fact that the project was completed during a period of international conflict in China proved that internal conflicts would not impede China's foreign policy commitments. Fourth, China could now guarantee itself access to Zambian copper and other vital exports. Last and most important, China gained trust, and prestige while solidifying the spirit of cooperation in the region and catapulted itself into the international arena as a force to be reckoned with.¹⁷

The long-term expansion of the Chinese economy was based upon a proliferation of heavy industrial of "blue steel" enterprise. Indeed, the pattern of Chinese economic growth was consciously directed by the party apparatus. In keeping with fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles, the goal of the industrialization program was to transform what was still basically an agrarian subsistence economy into a full-fledged industrial power. In this basic sense China still operated within ideologically Marxism-Leninism.

¹⁷Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 102 and Yu, *op. cit.*, p. 143-145.

The key to understanding all of China's concerns with its position in Africa lies in appreciating the long-term implications of China's domestic ideological and economic goals. As the scale and pace of China's industrialization grows the need for raw materials and export markets for subsequent production grows at an exactly parallel rate. While Africa is beset by a host of problems, enormous debt, drought, starvation and tribal conflict, it is still, nonetheless, an vital source of strategic raw material and commodities.

There are other very basic economic considerations that serve as incentives to Chinese policy. China is equally aware of Africa's potential as a market. In spite of this economic potential, Africa is responsible for less than 2% of world gross economic product.¹⁸ Its overall economic development has been in a condition of severe decline during the same period that the western industrial nations have experienced unprecedented economic growth. Given this set of conditions, the *potential* for economic growth on the Africa sub-continent is extraordinary to say the least. From the Chinese perspective Africa represents far more than simply a source of raw materials but also an expanding marketplace to sell finished products and establish the types of symbiotic relationships that fuel mutual long-term economic expansion.

¹⁸"Global Growth was Weaker than Expected in 1991, says IMF Staff," *IMF Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 11, 15 May 1992, pp. 162-164.

Actual growth for Africa in 1991 was 1.4%. Projected growth for the region in 1992 is 2.7%.

II. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA 1949-1989

Since 1949, Chinese foreign policy has undergone a myriad of changes and continuing development. This chapter examines China's foreign policy in Africa for the years between 1949 and 1989. As stated in the introduction, the Third World, particularly, Africa, has been a cornerstone in determining China's foreign policy objectives. While there are a variety of opinions regarding the ultimate goals of China's foreign policy, one can assume that it is based on the four factors that determine every nation's policies: security, ideology, domestic political/economic development and the international environment. These factors, along with the transitions in ideology from one of doctrine (1949) to a more pragmatic approach (1989-present), will be examined.

A. "LEAN ON ONE SIDE" 1949-1952

Since inception, the primary objective of the PRC has been threefold: preserving national unity, sovereignty, national development and restoring territorial integrity.¹⁹ The twin traumas of its birth, civil and foreign war and the fact that once-born, the PRC found itself sandwiched between two global powers engaged in the Cold War, proved to be the decisive factors in determining foreign policy and behavior. As a means of guaranteeing its

¹⁹ *Chinese View of the World*, ed. Hao, Y., and Guocang, H., (New York: Pantheon 1989), p. xvii.

security against foreign invasion and procuring assistance with its own agenda of domestic ideological development, the PRC adopted a "lean on one side" policy in alliance with the Soviet Union²⁰.

Most 20th Century contact between China and the African states had been exiguous at best prior to 1955. The majority of interactions were the direct result of PRC delegates being present at Soviet sponsored international functions. Though a few African leaders visited China, none of the four autonomous African states—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa—extended diplomatic recognition to China. The most interest Mao displayed in African affairs was when he sent a cable to South Africa in July 1950 protesting impending Apartheid legislation on the grounds that it would discriminate against the Chinese living there²¹. Despite scant contact there was a great deal of optimism among the Chinese leaders that communist ideology would soon triumph in Asia and Africa. China believed that its revolution was the proper model to follow in the struggle for independence²². Mao stated

Why was Abyssinia extinguished? First it was not only a weak country, but also a small country. Second, it was not as advanced as China; it was an ancient country passing from slave to the serf system, had no capitalism, no bourgeois political parties, much less a Communist Party; had no army like China's, much less an army like the Eighth Route Army.... Quite a large-scale guerrilla war still persists in Abyssinia, and if

²⁰ Yu, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

²¹ Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 15-16.

²² Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

the Abyssinians can only persevere, they will be able to reoccupy and revive their fatherland in a future fluctuation of world affairs.²³

The period ended with China closely aligned with the Soviet Union and in direct conflict with the United States as a result of the Korean War.

B. THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND THE AFRO-ASIAN ALLIANCE 1953-1959

The second period in Chinese foreign policy witnessed the attempts of the PRC to spread its wings independent of its big brother, the Soviet Union. With its internal power consolidated, its domestic policy on track and a feeling of relative security in its alliance with the Soviets, the PRC set out to win friends. Although the PRC's primary objective was to preserve and protect its eastern and southern flanks against a perceived threat of aggression from the United States, the PRC also sought a way out of isolationism. This period also denotes the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split. Until this time, the Soviets were perceived as the leader of all socialist states. The death of Stalin and The Non-Aligned Conference of Afro-Asian Nations at Bandung clearly changed that.²⁴

1. Non-Aligned Conference of Afro-Asian Nations (Bandung)

The African-Asian Conference, 1955, catapulted China onto the African scene and exposed the divergent ideological concepts of the Soviets and PRC. As early as three years prior to the Sino-Soviet split; it became clear that the Soviets and PRC possessed conflicting ideology in attaining African

²³ Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁴ Yu, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

support. For example, on the one hand, the Soviets appealed to the African states from a material perspective and the promise of economic aid. On the other hand, the PRC, unable to compete in terms of hard currency, focused on the heart, minds and fears of Africans by emphasizing race consciousness. While the Soviet action consisted of aid and credits; Chinese officials such as Kuo-Mo-Jo spoke of a common cultural heritage of the non-whites of Asia, and Africa.²⁵ Another delegate, Chu Tu Nan, asserted that "Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Africans shared a common heritage of oppression and of rich ancient cultures that had been destroyed by western imperialism." Chu asserted that the only alternative was a concerted effort by the non-white world to develop a new civilization incorporating their lost traditions with socialism.²⁶ Clearly China sought to create solidarity based on being non-white, non-European, and having the common experience of being a "poverty-stricken country exploited by 'foreign devils' ever since the Fifteenth Century, when the first Portuguese caravels touched the coasts of Africa and the Orient."²⁷ More significant was Chinese support for the FLN in Algeria's quest for self-determination, a cause which the Soviets did not support.²⁸

1. The Legacy of Bandung

The Asian-African (Bandung) Conference took place in Bandung, Indonesia. Of the 29 participating countries, six members were from Africa—

²⁵ Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 27

Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Libya and the Sudan—with Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco as observers. The Soviets and United States were not wanted because they were neither African nor Asian. During the conference Zhou En-Lai took the opportunity to expand "the five principles of coexistence" to a modified version tailored for anti-imperialism as applied to Africa²⁹.

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity.
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful coexistence.
6. Racial equality.
7. Nondiscrimination.
8. Equality of all nations.
9. Respect for freedom to choose political and economic systems.
10. Mutually beneficial relations between nations.

Very few African issues were discussed at Bandung, but the imagery of Afro-Asian solidarity became attractive political/ideological concepts. More importantly Zhou,

succeeded in creating an impression that there existed a united front of communist and neutralists based upon common conviction that western colonialism and western military pacts were the only real dangers threatening independence of the new nations of Asia and Africa.³⁰

²⁹Hevi, John Emmanuel. *The Dragon Embrace: Chinese Communists in Africa*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 7.

³⁰Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Africa in the Communist World*, Stanford University Press, 1963, p. 155.

The conference ended with a final communique supporting Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan right to self-determination. In a paragraph dedicated to racism Zhou En-Lai articulated PRC policy "We have always regarded that different races are equal. New China has not practiced discrimination."³¹

2. The Suez Crisis, 1956

During the Bandung Conference Zhou actively cultivated the Egyptian leader Abdul Nasser, and the PRC was formally recognized by Egypt on 5 May 1956 with full diplomatic relations being established on November 30, 1956. Realizing the importance of African issues, the PRC then established a new office of West Asian and African Affairs in the foreign ministry. With the exception of aid to the Algerian Revolutionary Army and pledges of support for Arabs in their struggle against Israel, little direct military interest was evident. This changed dramatically with the Suez Crisis. Not only was the Sino-Soviet rivalry beginning to heat up but the Suez (a vital strategic waterway) became a target for Chinese attention. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev vowed to send rockets against the West if Anglo and French attacks did not cease, China responded by sending \$5,000,000 and vowed to send 300,000 volunteers as well.³²

When Egypt gained control of the Suez from the British, Zhou took the opportunity to articulate the strength of the so-called Afro-Asian Movement. Chou En-Lai stated in March 1957

³¹Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

³² Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[Suez] was a great revelation to us, showing that the Asian and African countries are not yet powerful in material strength, all aggression by the colonialists can be frustrated, as long as we maintain our solidarity and firmly unite with all peace-loving forces of the world and wage a resolute struggle.³³

3. Afro-Asian Solidarity Council (AAPSO)

The period ended with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in 1957. From the conference and in accordance with President Nasser's desires, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council (AAPSO) evolved. The organization was located in Cairo and chaired by Anwar Sadat. Egypt had clearly desired to control key posts but the influence of Soviets and the PRC came to dominate the organization. The PRC and Soviets engaged in incessant arguments which ultimately served to the advantage of the PRC. Africa was rapidly changing. Morocco, Tunisia and Ghana all achieved independence. The Suez Crisis, along with the Algerian uprising, stimulated the movement against western imperialism. With the Afro-Asian Council devoted exclusively to the anticolonial struggle, China was able to forge new contacts and challenge the Soviets for leadership of the socialist camp. The Chinese, after all, were an authentic Asian power while the Soviets were admitted as "Asians honoris causa."³⁴ By the time the Council completed its first year of work, China had not only successfully placed more delegates but had also pledged more money than the Soviets (\$28,000 to \$25,200) for the coming

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 25 and Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁴ Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

year.³⁵ The Council clearly represented a tremendous opportunity for the PRC to pursue its objective of becoming the leader of the Third World.

C. UNITED FRONT STRATEGY AND THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT 1958-1965

The third period began with China experiencing severe domestic problems as well as even more strained relations with the Soviet Union. A poor harvest in 1956 coupled with lagging economic development, Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, and an inadequate level of Soviet aid, compelled China to reassess its situation. Thus on 1 March 1958 Mao announced the "Great Leap Forward" designed to accelerate economic development independent of the Soviet economic model. According to Mao, "Stalin had paid attention only to half of the factors that promote economic development: technique, but not politics; cadres but not masses; industry but not agriculture; the constraints imposed by objective conditions, but not the potential created by man's subjective will."³⁶

The implementation of the "Great Leap Forward" was a clear challenge to the Soviet model of communism and a rejection of Soviet policies. Over the next two years the rift widened. China became disenchanted by the Soviet hesitancy to provide support to the regional agenda of the PRC, such as the liberation of the offshore islands, annexation of Tibet and the serious border clashes with India. As a result, the PRC initiated a fundamental reassessment of its position in international relations. Lack of definitive Soviet support as

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 155-157.

³⁶Harding, Harry, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976*, California, Stanford University Press, 1981, p. 172.

well as the Soviets' interest in a more managed relationship with the United States convinced China that the Soviets were no longer committed to the revolutionary cause.³⁷

By 1960 the Sino-Soviet split was fully recognized and the "U.S.-Soviet-China Strategic Triangle" was born. The split was significant for several reasons. First, it signified a complete break with the Soviets not only on the domestic front but also in the area of the foreign policy and revolutionary agenda. Second, the Chinese leadership had made a conscious effort to end the relationship in order to preserve its vision of socialist national development. Third, the Third World became China's primary focus in foreign policy, with Africa at the center. Fourth, China's new position represented an "internationalization" of foreign policy that stood in opposition to the hegemonic ambitions of the Soviet Union and the United States. It was also significant that China sought to formulate a new international strategy that could counter the revisionist metamorphosis of Soviet-style socialism.³⁸ Chinese policy makers anticipated that anti-Revisionism and anti-imperialism would meet with equal enthusiasm in Third World. In 1965 Lin Piao stated

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin American constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in North America and West European capitalist

³⁷ Yu, George T., "The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Aid to Africa in" *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*. Ed. Thomas H. Hendrickson and Warren Weinstein, New York: Praeger, 1984, p. 3.

countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American people who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their international duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.³⁹

China sought to construct a new Revolutionary Strategy premised upon the commonality of the Third World in the struggle for economic and social development. Africa was central—the testing ground where this new strategy would be implemented.

1. Zhou En-Lai and the United Front Strategy

The doctrine of "The United Front" as a fundamental principle of Marxist-Leninism, is defined as "a united and temporary alignment between a community party or state and one or more non-communist political units with the dual purpose, on the communist side, of confronting a common enemy and furthering the revolutionary cause."⁴⁰ Throughout the period 1960-1965, the United Front strategy was an essential component of Chinese foreign policy, linking its ideology with its conduct in foreign affairs.

After China's venture into African affairs during the Suez Crisis, by 1960, at the height of the anti-colonialist movement Africa, China was showing considerable interest in the long-term prospects for revolution in

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Armstrong, J. D., *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and United Front Doctrine*, (California: University of California, Berkeley, Press, 1971), pp. 13-14.

Africa.⁴¹ China perceived of Africa as the perfect medium for revolutionary struggle and its strategy was to encourage four trends in political consciousness: anti-imperialism, support for the African national liberation movements, the pursuit of self-reliance and furtherance of Afro-Asian solidarity.⁴² Thus China's strategy in Africa developed into creating a broad united front directed against the practice of external imperialism while simultaneously assisting in the foment of internal revolution.

Zhou En-Lai visited ten African nations between December 14, 1963 and February 4, 1964 in an attempt to promulgate these views and assess the reaction. Zhou stated:

The purpose of my visit is to enhance the mutual understanding between China, and the friendly African countries, strengthen the traditional friendship and cooperation between China and the African countries, increase our knowledge and learn useful things from African people.⁴³

Zhou, on this tour to Africa, wanted to somehow gauge African perceptions of Asia and to break the "isolate and contain" policy that the U.S. had imposed upon the PRC. He also wished to establish a bond of solidarity and brotherhood with progressive African leaders. Zhou was accompanied to Africa by Chen Yi and an entourage of about forty. Their itinerary included Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tunisia, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, the primarily Arabic or Arabized nations. (Snow, pp. 74-76)

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁴³ "Premier Chou en Lai Answers Newsmen's Questions in Accra," *Peking (Beijing) Review*, No. 4, 24 January 1964, p. 15.

Throughout the tour Zhou emphasized "the dichotomous nature of China's policies' with Zhou playing on contrapuntal themes of peace and struggle, progress and poverty, weakness and strength, cooperation and opposition." (Hutchinson, p. 62) Zhou patiently explained such Chinese policies in opposition to the Test Ban Treaty and tactfully promulgated his ideology by unveiling a revised version of "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."⁴⁴

1. China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence.
2. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the governments of the African and Arab countries.
3. It supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice.
4. It supports the African and Arab countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful negotiations.
5. It holds that the sovereignty of the African and Arab countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed.

Despite Zhou's anti-imperialist appeal, his arguments were not received as wholeheartedly as he had anticipated. He was constantly reminded of the shortcomings of China's policies everywhere he went. The African nations wanted money, not weapons and rhetoric. In Egypt he was shown the Soviet-built Aswan Dam. In Algeria he learned very quickly that some Africans did not accept China as the titular leader of the revolutionary struggle in Africa. They gladly accepted China's assistance, but this was an

⁴⁴"Premier Chou en Lai: Revolutionary Prospects in Africa Excellent," *Peking (Beijing) Review*, No. 7., 14 February 1964, p. 7.

African struggle to be won or lost by Africans. In Morocco he was faced with the claims of King Hassan that the Soviets were backing the Algerians. In Ghana, once again he had to compete with Soviet influence and monetary aid. In East Africa, his delegation represented the first Chinese visit of the century. In fact the Africans were challenging the Chinese to put their money where their mouth was. More importantly, the African leaders told Zhou that they did not completely accept Chinese ideology. Nor did they accept the idea that the United States was the leading imperialist threat.⁴⁵⁴⁶

Zhou went to Africa with the objective of teaching the Africans how to distinguish between their "enemies and friends." (Hutchinson pp. 126-147) What followed was a series of setbacks. Although China was successful in linking ideological formulations with actual situations in some instances (i.e. backing opposition movements in Kenya, Cameroon, the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda) Chinese intentions were viewed with suspicion. Subsequent to Zhou's tour Chinese delegations were expelled from several African nations for subversive activities (see Table 2) In addition, Zhou left the continent without obtaining full support for the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. However Zhou did learn some valuable lessons, the most important being that Africa was diverse and beholden to no one superpower or ideology.

⁴⁵ Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-147 and Clough, Michael, *Free at Last?: U.S. Policy towards Africa and the End of the Cold War*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p. 7.

⁴⁶ During 1960 campaign, President Kennedy asserted that "we lost ground in Africa because we have neglected and ignored the needs and aspirations of African people." The result was a U.S. diplomatic offensive aimed at wooing African leaders.

TABLE 2. AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA, 1956-72⁴⁷

STATE	YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE	YEAR RELATIONS ESTABLISHED
Algeria	1962	1962
Burundi	1962	1963; relations suspended in 1965, restored in 1971
Cameroon	1960	1972
Central African Republic	1960	1964; relations suspended in 1966
Chad	1960	1972
Congo (Brazzaville)	1960	1964
Dahomey	1960	1964; relations suspended in 1966, restored in 1972
Equatorial Guinea	1968	1970
Ethiopia	—	1970
Ghana	1957	1960; relations suspended in 1966, restored in 1972
Guinea	1958	1958
Kenya	1963	1963
Mali	1960	1960
Malagasy Republic	1960	1972
Mauritania	1960	1965
Morocco	1956	1958
Nigeria	1960	1971
Rwanda	1962	1971
Senegal	1960	1971
Sierra Leone	1961	1971
Somalia	1960	1960
Sudan	1956	1958
Togo	1960	1972
Tanzania (until 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar)	1964	1964
Tunisia	1956	1964; relations suspended in 1967, restored in 1971
Uganda	1962	1962
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	1922	1956
Zambia	1964	1964
Zaire	1960	1972

Note: Tanganyika gained its independence in 1961 and entered into diplomatic relations with China in the same year; Zanzibar won independence in 1963, and relations with China began in the same year. The union of the two states was achieved in 1964.

(Source: Yu, George T., *China's Foreign Policy, a Study of Tanzania*, New York: Praeger Press, 1975).

⁴⁷Yu, 1975, *op. cit.*, p. 8

Prior to Zhou's tour, China's approach to Africa was based on its own revolutionary experience and ideology rather than a knowledge of African conditions and aspirations. China had overestimated the potential impact of antirevisionist and anti-imperialist rhetoric and its relative importance to African nations. The African nations had given China a "wake up call" which let them know their ideological preconceptions were wrong and the assumption that "Africa was bound to follow the direct course of China's revolutionary map" was invalid.⁴⁸

After the tour, Zhou embarked on an all out offensive on the diplomatic, economic and revolutionary front in order to gain friends and to establish China as the leader of a broad united front in the Third World. The first priority was to convene a second Bandung Conference in 1965. During the AAPSO Conference 1964 preparatory meeting in Djakarta, China vehemently opposed Soviet participation on the basis that they were neither African nor Asian. (Snow, p. 120) This action led to Soviet charges of race baiting by the Chinese. In a letter to the participating countries, the Soviets contended that the Chinese were attempting

... to install little by little an attitude of suspicion towards many peoples of socialist countries merely because they are whites ... The PRC government preaching of race is no more than a false cloak for its ambitions of hegemony among the Afro-Asian countries.⁴⁹

The controversy and period ended with the cancellation of the Second Bandung Conference, which had been scheduled for 1965, which was

⁴⁸ Larkin, *op cit.*, p. 199.

⁴⁹ "For Unity in the Struggle for Peace, Freedom and National Independence: Statement by the Soviet Government," *New Times*, No. 19, 1964, p. 32.

an additional blow to China's psyche and agenda. Nevertheless, there were lessons learned from the period. With regard to the united front strategy and its effect on China's behavior, wide gaps appeared between its statements and its actual performance. China's united front strategy had five shortcomings that had precluded its successful implementation. First, the PRC believed that it already possessed extensive influence throughout the Third World and therefore developed policies aimed at long-term objectives rather than first securing and cementing its tentative alliances. Second, China's entire perception of indigenous African movements had been erroneously distorted to conform to China's Revolutionary experience. Third, China had linked its international initiatives to its own strategic requirements, thereby arousing the suspicion of Africans. Fourth, China's preoccupation with the Vietnam War (which China intended making a major topic before Second Bandung Conference in 1964 [which was cancelled]) slowed the momentum of Chinese activities. And fifth, the rigid commitment to a United Front had resulted in too many constraints and tactical limitations while dealing with individual countries.⁵⁰ Regrouping from these setbacks China made a conscientious effort to redirect its focus away from North and West Africa towards East Africa. Specifically Tanzania, where, because of the setbacks elsewhere, China wisely sought firsthand knowledge of Tanzanian culture and politics and developed its policies accordingly. Although China's new foreign policy, as well as the Great Leap Forward, were failures on a grand scale, China has nonetheless succeeded in achieving the status of an international player.

⁵⁰ Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

D. CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ISOLATIONISM (1966-1969)

This period can be generally characterized as one of setbacks, in the international arena. By 1966 China was firmly enveloped in the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." As a result, Sino-African relations were substantially suspended, with the exception of the East African nations, particularly Tanzania.

The Cultural Revolution created a very negative international image for China and adversely affected its relations in Africa. Bruce Larkin states five hypotheses as the basis of the wide-scale diminution of China's position in Africa.⁵¹

1. The efficiency and effectiveness of Chinese embassies in Africa suffered: ambassadors and staff members were called home for extended stays.
2. Supporting facilities in China were preoccupied with internal disputes which interfered with training of foreign students.
3. Moderate economic recession may have increased competition for funds.
4. The Cultural Revolution showed that there was no single "Chinese Path to Socialism."
5. The vastness and audacity of the Cultural Revolution made it more difficult for China to conduct a united front strategy.

Though the Cultural Revolution slowed down China's revolutionary strategy in Africa, some forward movement was still achieved. The most successful venture was that of the Tan-Zam Railway, as described above, which required an enormous financial commitment on the part of China. Moreover, China continued to funnel aid (in form of credits) to development

⁵¹ Larkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-145.

projects in such states as Guinea (\$10 million), Somalia (\$3 million), Mali (\$4 million), and Algeria (\$2 million).⁵² These were constructive policies that allowed China at least to keep up the appearance that its deep commitment to African development was still ongoing.

On the other side of the coin, China suffered some significant political setbacks in the form of broken relations with failed revolutionary movements. Until this period its largest defeat was in the Congo in 1960. The Congo had been a playing field where the Soviet Union, the U.S. and China had all vigorously competed. According to Mao "If we can take the Congo, we can have all of Africa!"⁵³ China backed the government of Patrice Lumumba but how solid China's ties to the revolutionaries were is a matter of question. In fact China attempted to keep its involvement secret throughout the struggle.⁵⁴ In addition, revolutions and coups d'état led to the suspension of diplomatic relations in Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Dahomey, Ghana and Tunisia.

The period ended with China having to reestablish its position and credibility in the African communities. An increase of support for revolutionary movements throughout Africa (See Table 3) was the goal of a policy designed to establish intimate ties with the movements which would eventually attain power. The Chinese hoped that their investment and

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 81

⁵³ Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, p. 81 and Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁵⁴ Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 178

commitment would find fruition in the form of African support in Beijing's quest for a seat in the United Nations.

TABLE 3. SOVIET AND CHINESE SUPPORT OF MAJOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO 1970

Territory	Organization	Certain or Probable Recipient of Support from			Not Recipient of Support from China or the Soviet Union
		China	Soviet Union and China	Soviet Union	
Angola	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) União Nacional Para a Independência total de Angola (UNITA) Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE)	UNITA		MPLA	GRAE
Mozambique	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) Comite Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO)	COREMO	FRELIMO		
Portuguese Guinea	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)		PAIGC		
Rhodesia	Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)	ZANU		ZAPU	
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC) Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	PAC		ANC	
South-West Africa	South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) South-West African National Union (SWANU)	SWANU		SWAPO	

(Source: Larkin, B., *China and Africa 1949-1970: Foreign Policy of Peoples Republic of China*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 188.)

E. 1970-1979—CHINA'S REEMERGENCE IN AFRICA

After the military clash in the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, it became clear that the Soviets posed the greatest and most immediate threat to China's security. In response to the Soviet threat, China initiated a series of overtures to the U.S. which resulted in a Sino-American rapprochement and the visits

of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon.⁵⁵ At this juncture, China stepped up its activities in Africa.

The Sino-Soviet conflict had been smoldering throughout the 1960s. By 1970, when China emerged from the Great Proletariat Revolution it was ready to challenge and resist the Soviet threat. Africa was the perfect arena for the battle.⁵⁶ Thus in 1970, China embarked upon an unparalleled diplomatic offensive in Africa. The culmination of its efforts were realized by a significant enhancement of Chinese influence on African affairs and the much cherished admission to the United Nations. China achieved such successful results by accelerating its participation on three major fronts—economic aid, diplomatic relations and arms transfer.

1. Economic Aid

One of the first initiatives undertaken in 1970 was an increase in economic aid to African countries. China had learned from its experiences during the period 1954-1966 that the African leadership was far more responsive to money than rhetoric. China accordingly tripled its monetary commitment and became the primary source of aid to Africa, supplanting the Soviet Union. In order to fully appreciate the scale and depth of China's initiative (see Table 4) a contrast with the Soviet program needs to be made. First, China contributed aid to more African countries than the Soviet Union (29 to 22). Second, China's contributions were much more geographically

⁵⁵ Pollack, Jonathan, *China in the Evolving International System*, (California: RAND, 1983), p. 8.

⁵⁶ Yu, 1980, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

dispersed while the Soviets primarily contributed the aid to the North African nations. Third, China contributed aid to a greater number of emerging nations than did the Soviets (23 to 11).⁵⁷ Finally, in comparing figures for the periods 1954-1966 to 1970-1979, China increased economic aid from \$428 million in 1966 to \$1945 in 1979. In contrast Soviet aid decreased from \$1900 million to \$113 million during the identical period. (Yu, 1980, pp. 169-171)

The increase in aid witnessed by African nations affirmed China's commitment in clear, substantive terms.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 169-171.

TABLE 4. CHINESE AND SOVIET AID COMMITMENTS TO AFRICA, 1954-66 AND 1970-79
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	1954-66		1970-79		1979	
	China	USSR	China	USSR	China	USSR
Algeria	52	236	-	479	-	
Angola	-	-	-	10	-	
Benin	-	-	44	-	-	
Burundi	-	-	60	-	40	
Cameroon	-	8	71	-		
Central African Empire	4	-	-	2	-	
Chad	-	-	50	2	-	
Congo	25	10	-	4	-	
Egypt	85	1,001	28	299	-	
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	-	1	-	
Ethiopia	-	102	85	95	-	
Gambia	-	-	17	-		
Ghana	42	93	-	1		
Guinea-Bissau	-	-	17	14		
Kenya	18	48	-	-		
Liberia	-	-	10	-		
Madagascar	-	-	66	-		
Mali	55	59	4	-		
Mauritania	-	-	59	1	-	
Mauritius	-	-	35	-		
Morocco	-	44	32	44	-	
Mozambique	-	-	59	2		
Niger	-	-	51	2		
Nigeria	-	-	-	7		
Rwanda	-	-	22	1		
Senegal	-	7	49	2		
Sierra Leone	-	28	30	-		
Somalia	22	66	111	87		
Sudan	-	22	82	-		
Tanzania	54	20	305	19		
Togo	-	-	45	-		
Tunisia	-	34	97	55	-	
Uganda	15	16	-	-		
Upper Volta	-	-	52	1		
Zaire	-	-	100	-		
Zambia	-	-	290	-		
TOTALS	\$428	\$1,900	\$1,945	\$1,135		

Source: Adapted and compiled by author from George T. Yu, *Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa*, in David E. Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa*, and Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid in Non-Communist Countries 1979 and 1954-1979, 1980*, ER80-10318U, Washington, DC, October 1980.

2. Diplomatic Relations

Over a nine year period China had aggressively campaigned to win African nations over to its side of the Sino-Soviet conflict. By 1979 China had forged diplomatic ties with 26 additional nations, bring the total to 42 (Table 5). The diplomatic initiatives were pointedly successful in light of China's refusal to establish relations with any nation that recognized Taiwan. (By way of contrast, Taiwan established relations with only three nations.)

China also received a substantial number of African heads of state and representatives in Beijing (Table 6 refers). Conferring the pomp of state ceremony upon the visiting delegations was clearly designed to enhance mutual prestige and help to diminish the Soviet power base in Africa by painting the Soviets as imperialist.

In the perception of Chinese leadership, the Soviets had three principal objectives in Africa. First, to exploit the natural resources of the continent such as copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold and uranium. Second, to advance Soviet strategic interests in the competition with the U.S. for world hegemony and third, to prevent African unity.⁵⁸

China continuously sought to expose any Soviet action which would bring Soviet intentions and loyalty under the questioning scrutiny of Third World nations. In the case of Africa, China pointed out the lack of Soviet support for Algeria in 1950, the Congolese in 1960, and in the Arab-Israeli

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

wars, which had denied the Arab people the right of "Waging a just war against the Israeli aggressor."⁵⁹

TABLE 5. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S NEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN AFRICA, 1970-79

Year	State
1970	Equatorial Guinea
1970	Ethiopia
1971	Cameroon
1971	Nigeria
1971	Rwanda
1971	Senegal
1971	Sierra Leone
1972	Chad
1972	Malagasy Republic
1972	Mauritius
1972	Togo
1972	Zaire
1973	Upper Volta
1974	Gabon
1974	Gambia
1974	Guinea-Bissau
1974	Niger
1975	Botswana
1975	Comoros
1975	Sao Tome and Principe
1975	Mozambique
1976	Cape Verde
1976	Seychelles
1977	Liberia
1978	Libya ⁶⁰
1979	Djibouti

Source: Adopted from George T. Yu, *Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa*, 1980.

⁵⁹ *New China News Agency*, "Look at its Past and You Can Tell its Present," 9 Dec. 1975, p. 18.

⁶⁰ Libya had unilaterally announced recognition of China in 1971 but had continued to maintain relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

TABLE 6. MAJOR AFRICAN DELEGATIONS TO CHINA, 1971-1979⁶¹

Year	Leader of Delegation
1971	President of the Liberations Front of Mozambique
1971	Deputy President of Sudan
1972	President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia
1972	Vice-president of Zambia
1973	President of Zaire
1973	President of Cameroon
1973	President of the Congo
1973	Preside of Sierra Leone
1974	President of Zambia
1974	President of Senegal
1974	Vice-president of the Supreme Military Council of Niger
1974	President of Togo
1974	Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria
1974	President of Mauritania
1974	President of Gabon
1975	President of the Liberation Front of Mozambique
1975	President of Gambia
1975	President of Sao Tome and Principe
1976	President of Malagasy Republic
1976	President of Benin
1976	President of Botswana
1976	President of the Central African Republic
1976	Vice-president of Tanzania
1977	President of Mauritania
1977	President of Gabon
1977	President of Sudan
1977	Prime Minister of the Congo
1977	Vice-president of Somalia
1977	General Secretary of the Zimbabwe African National Union
1977	President of the Supreme Military Council of Niger
1977	President of Cameroon
1978	Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt
1978	Minister of the Supreme Military Council of Ghana
1978	President of Somalia
1978	President of Seychelles
1978	President of Mozambique
1978	President of the Congo
1978	President of Rwanda
1978	President of Liberia
1978	President of Gabon
1979	President of Burundi

Source: Adapted and compiled by author from George T. Yu, *Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa*, in David E. Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa*, 1980, p. 174.

⁶¹Through March 1979 only.

3. Arms Transfers

In terms of arms supplies, the Soviet Union still outdistanced China in the volume of arms transfer. (Table 7) Arms sales were not a focal point of Chinese foreign policy during this era. In fact China continuously criticized the Soviet Union for providing arms but nothing else. The majority of Chinese arms transfers took place in the period 1974-1979, in response to the war in Angola.

TABLE 7. CHINESE AND SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO AFRICA, 1967-79
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

African State	China	Soviet Union
Algeria	—	1500
Angola	—	300
Benin	—	20
Burundi	1	10
Cameroon	10	—
Central African Empire	—	1
Chad	—	10
Congo	10	50
Egypt	60	2615
Equatorial Guinea	—	10
Gambia	5	—
Guinea	5	60
Guinea-Bissau	—	30
Libya	—	5000
Malagasy Republic	—	1
Malawi	1	—
Mali	5	110
Morocco	—	20
Mozambique	5	170
Nigeria	—	150
Rwanda	1	—
Somalia	5	210
Sudan	5	75
Tanzania	105	300
Tunisia	10	—
Uganda	10	65
Zaire	31	110
Zambia	32	60
TOTALS	301	11,076

Source: *WMEAT World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-1979*, Washington, DC, 1980.

Through Zaire and Tanzania, China backed, trained and supplied arms to all three liberation movements in the conflict with Portugal—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the total independence of Angola, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA). When the Portuguese were overthrown in 1974, the conflict was transformed into Soviet and Chinese backed factional fighting. The Soviets supported the MPLA while China backed both the FLNA and UNITA.⁶² The MPLA seemingly triumphed in February, 1976, and made attempts to push into Zaire. Assessing the apparent failure of its Chinese jousting in Angola, the Chinese leadership concluded that it was not prepared at that juncture in time to challenge the Soviets in the military arena. Thereafter China's arms transfers were insignificant and symbolic in nature.⁶³

The perceptual shifts in Chinese foreign policy during the seventies were driven by an all-consuming preoccupation with challenging the Soviet Union in Africa. China viewed Soviet imperialism as a threat to world peace. This view of reality was the framework of Mao's formulation of the "Three Worlds Theory" which was yet another form of the United Front strategy. The strategy, in essence, found the interests of China, the U.S. and the Third World and set them in opposition to the Soviet Union. Mao first articulated the "Three Worlds Theory" to Kenneth Kaunda in 1974 and also stated "We

⁶² Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

are the Third World."⁶⁴ Mao was firm in his conviction that together they could successfully oppose Soviet hegemony in the region.

Henceforth China "adopted a complementary approach toward Africa and Third World issues"⁶⁵ and would stop at nothing to undermine Soviet influence. This was true even in those cases where its actions conflicted with its ideology and that of African nations. A prime example of which was Chinese support for the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, pursued even though it greatly irritated Arabs.⁶⁶ However, Deng Xiaoping "assured Africans that when China became an advanced nation" it would not abandon the Third world. While the policy was effective for a time, it had run its course by the time the 1980s approached. Thus, China abandoned its strategy and began to distance itself from the U.S. The split was more complete when the Reagan administration exhibited a more pro-Taiwanese stance than the Carter administration.⁶⁷

F. 1980-1989. POST MAO: THE ERA OF PRAGMATISM

After the death of Mao in 1976, China implemented a series of domestic reforms which essentially disavowed most of the ideological concerns and policies that had been associated with Mao for the last 20 years of his life. In July 1981, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the

⁶⁴ Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁶⁵ Lim, Z., *op. cit.*, pp. 239.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Harding, Harry, *A Fragile Relationship*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1992), p. 109.

Communist Party (CPC) an evaluation and verdict on its history since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was issued. While the document praised the contributions of Mao it was also highly critical of his policies, particularly the Cultural Revolution.⁶⁸

Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist and theorist. It is true that he made gross mistakes during the "cultural revolution," but, if we judge his activities as a whole, his contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his mistakes. His merits are primary and his errors secondary. He rendered indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our Party and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in winning victory for the cause of liberation of the Chinese people, in founding the People's Republic of China and in advancing our socialist cause. He made major contributions to the liberation of the oppressed nations of the world and to the progress of mankind.⁶⁹

1982 not only marked the 27th anniversary of the Bandung Conference but also marked the establishment of a new direction in foreign policy unveiled at the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party (CPC), June 1981. A Former CPC General Secretary stated that this signified the era of a new "peaceful independent policy" designed not only to open the door externally but to stimulate new dynamism at home.⁷⁰ Because Africa has always been at the center of China's foreign policy the effect is three-fold:

- Peace and independence,
- The Four Principles, and
- Third World stance reevaluated.

⁶⁸ *Beijing Review*, July 1981, p. 29.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Hu, Yaogang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization," *Beijing Review*, 13 September 1982, 29.

1. Peace and Independence

By the end of 1982 Sino-American relations were markedly strained. China was highly suspicious of the Reagan administration strengthening its relations with Taiwan. In addition, China was aggravated by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. From the perspective of the PRC leadership, there was a clear linkage between U.S. support of the Taiwanese military and the continuing failure to get reunification talks with Taiwan underway. The level of hostility was reduced when the Reagan administration, as a conciliatory action, agreed to curtail future arms sales to Taiwan.⁷¹ By the end of 1982, China found it in its best interests to loosen its ties with the United States and announced an independent foreign policy based upon the "Five Principles of Coexistence." Moreover, former (CPC) Secretary Hu Yaobang proclaimed "China never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power."⁷²

This move towards neutrality was an attempt to refocus its foreign policy and re-establish its stature and influence in the Third World, which had been weakened by rapprochement with the U.S. Because Africa has always been an integral part of China's foreign policy, Premier Zhao Ziyang, like Zhou En Lai, embarked on a political/ideological tour to 11 African nations lasting from December 1982 to January 1983. Included in the tour were Egypt, Gabon, Algeria, Morocco, Kenya, Guinea, Zaire, Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. Zhao came to Africa with almost an identical

⁷¹ Harding, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

⁷² Hu, *op. cit.*, 1982, 29.

theme to Zhou En Lai nearly 20 years ago. According to Zhao Ziyang, the objective of this tour was to, "learn from African peoples' experiences in construction, promote mutual understanding and friendship, strengthen unity and cooperation between China and African countries."⁷³

While the objectives were almost identical, the intent and approach differed. The theme throughout the tour was economic and technological cooperation, African and Third World solidarity, South to South cooperation and the importance of the role of the Organization of African Unity. (OAU).

While in Egypt, Zhao said:

The economic and technological cooperation between the two countries has had a very good beginning. China will make efforts to further develop this cooperation on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit, better practical results, more diversity in form and mutual development He pointed out, "China's foreign policy is consistent, with two basic points first oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace; and second, firmly unit and cooperate with the other third world countries. This policy was reiterated at the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The first countries I visit after the 12th Party Congress are Egypt and other African countries. This shows that China will further carry out the policy of firmly strengthening its unity and co-operation with the other third world countries, as was reiterated at the 12th Party Congress ... Organization of African Unity has made contributions to safeguarding the solidarity of African and Third World countries."⁷⁴

Zhao reiterated this theme to each and every country and was received warmly.

⁷³"Premier Zhao Visits 10 African Countries," *Beijing Review*, 3 January, 1983, p. 6.

⁷⁴Ibid and "Premier Zhao visits Algeria and Morocco," *Beijing Review*, 10 January 1983, p. 7.
For a full account of the trip to individual countries, see *Beijing Review*, 6-24 January 1983.

In 1983, China established diplomatic relations with Angola. In 1985 China stepped up the level of economic aid to Ethiopia in the form of 15,000 tons of food, 75,000 agricultural tools, and 10,000 blankets. In 1986 leaders from the ANC visited Beijing which resulted in a commitment of material aid.⁷⁵

China's actions were indicative of an ideological metamorphosis from the stage of revolutionary struggle to that of economic development and cooperation. In order to pursue economic development, China needed a peaceful and stable environment. Within this context China vowed never to involve itself within the internal affairs of African nations (South Africa excluded) and since 1983 has generally maintained its policy of non-intervention.

2. Emergence of Four Principles

On Zhou En-Lai's visit to African in 1963-1964, the "Eight Principles Governing Chinese Foreign Aid"⁷⁶ were implemented and policy. The "eight

⁷⁵ Xuetong, Yan, "Sino-African Relations in the 1990s," *CSIS Africa Notes*, 19 April 1988, p. 3.

⁷⁶ *The Eight Principles Governing Red Chinese Foreign Aid* are:

1. In the assistance it furnishes to other countries, the Chinese government constantly observes the principle of equality and mutual benefit. It never considers this assistance as a type of unilateral charity but rather as mutual aid. Thanks to this assistance, friendly and newly independent countries can progressively develop their national economies, free themselves from colonial control, and consolidate world anti-imperialist forces.
2. In furnishing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient states. It never asks for any privilege and never poses conditions.
3. The Chinese government furnishes it economic assistance in the form of loans exempt from interest or at a minimum rate of interest and provides long periods for their repayment, so as to reduce to a minimum the burden carried by the recipient countries.
4. In furnishing economic aid to foreign countries, the Chinese government does not seek to place the recipients in a state of dependency on China but rather to aid them to move forward, step by step, on the pathway of self-sufficiency.

principles" were essentially a set of ideological guidelines to establish the goals and criteria for loans and aid that China intended as assistance to African nations in becoming self-sufficient. Almost 20 years later the *Eight Principles*⁷⁷ were supplemented by *Four Principles Governing Sino-African Economic and Technological Cooperations*⁷⁸. Marked ideological differences

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5. Projects that the Chinese government helps the recipient countries to realize are, as much as possible, those capable of yielding rapid results for a minimum investment. This makes it possible for the recipient governments to increase their revenue and accumulate capital.
 6. The Chinese government furnishes the best material manufactured by its own plants at prices prevalent on the international markets. If the material provides not to be in conformance with the norms and the quality desired, it promises to replace it.
 7. To be sure that personnel of the recipient country has fully assimilated the necessary knowledge to use its technical aid, the Chinese government offers it the appropriate professional training.
 8. The experts that the Chinese government sends to recipient countries to aid them in their tasks of construction have the same standard of living as the experts of these countries. Chinese experts are forbidden to formulate any special demands or to benefit from special advantages. From Cooley Appendix B, pp. 224-225.

⁷⁷Xuetong, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁷⁸The following are the *Four Principles Governing Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation*:

1. In carrying out economic and technological cooperation with African countries, China abides by the principles of unity and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, respects their sovereignty, does not interfere in their internal affairs, attaches no political conditions and asks for no privileges whatsoever.
2. In China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries, full play will be given to the strong points and potentials of both sides on the basis of their actual needs and possibilities, and efforts will be made to achieve good economic results with less investment, shorter construction cycles and quicker returns.
3. China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries takes a variety of forms suited to the local specific conditions, such as offering technical services, training technical and management personnel, engaging in scientific and technological exchanges, undertaking construction projects, and entering into cooperative production and joint ventures. With regard to the cooperative projects it undertakes, the Chinese side will see to it that the signed contracts are observed, the quality of work guaranteed and stress laid on friendship. The experts and technical personnel dispatched by the Chinese side do not ask for special treatment.
4. The purpose of China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries is to contribute to the enhancement of the self-reliant capabilities of both sides and promote the growth of the respective national economies by complementing and helping each other.

between the policies are apparent. The Four Principles emphasized economic and technological cooperation based on mutual benefit.⁷⁹

China has always confronted inadequate financial resources in implementing its foreign policy. The change of focus was intended as a solution to the monetary strain that its aid program had created. Since 1983, talks with African nations have centered primarily on economic cooperation development and mutual benefit. In 1986, China signed approximately \$480 million in construction and labor contracts as well as initiated trade and technology exchange committees with Tunisia, Mauritius, Gabon, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya.⁸⁰

3. Third World Position .

Although China is a developing nation itself, it has attempted to provide leadership and economic aid to African nations. During this period aid to African nations increased from \$50 million in 1983 to \$400 million in 1987. Of course, there have been tradeoffs, not the least of which is a \$350 million trade imbalance in favor of China. Nevertheless China has been successful in implementing its model of economic reform; all the while criticizing its nemeses, the United States and the Soviet Union, for meddling in the internal affairs of Africa. What makes the Chinese economic model so attractive for some African nations is that it provides much needed assistance while still allowing the measure of political and economic independence that African nations consider a necessity.

⁷⁹Xuetong, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁸⁰Xuetong, *op. cit.*, p. 4

The bottom line is that some African nations may identify with China because, "similar to them, they are developing nations and unlike them, China has real potential to be an authentic global power and perhaps someday defend Africa's interest."

G. SUMMARY

Since 1949, China's foreign policy has evolved from one based on revolutionary ideology and armed conflict to the more pragmatic stance of peaceful coexistence and economic reform. China's primary objective and ambition has been to gain influence, respect and international political support.

Although China has forged relations with other developing/Third World nations in Latin America and Asia, ideological differences, strategic considerations and the issue of Taiwan have served as natural barriers to gaining prestige and spreading its influence. Thus, Africa became the sole venue by which China could successfully compete with the super powers on a level playing field.

China's role and activities can, and have often been, perceived as that of an agitator pursuing an agenda of world revolution. The most difficult aspect of analyzing Chinese foreign policy to this point has involved the task of deciphering the rhetorical content from the real purpose. One element of the analytical task is clear, however, the heart and thrust of China's foreign policy has been its African ambitions.

China has been successful in many of its initiatives and ventures. While it can also be noted that numerous ventures failed and failed miserably.

There are several reasons for the most notable failures. First, China's successes and failures in foreign policy have been directly correlated with its domestic policies. A primary example was the "Great Proletarian Revolution" in that it sent out an ill-conceived message that China did not practice what it preached.

Second, China has consistently overestimated the blanket support revolutionary ideology would receive in the African states. The fact of the matter is that most African nations have always been wary of China's motives and intentions.

Third and most important, Zhou was not sufficiently versed in the diversity among the African states. As a result, China did not take the variations of cultural realities and political aims into account while seeking to establish extremely broad-based political and economic alliances. This naiveté was evident when Zhou En Lai stated during the 1960s "Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent." Varying sets of priorities and objectives among diverse sectors of the African population made it almost impossible for China to set a consistent policy. As a result China resorted to implementing policy, on an ad hoc basis, supporting those regions and/or elements that exhibited characteristics favorable, in at least some degree, to China's ideology.

As has been seen, the 1970s witnessed a perceptual change at the base of Chinese foreign policy. As China emerged from the Great Proletarian Revolution, its objectives in Africa, as elsewhere, became focused on the pragmatic and less revolutionary and rhetorical. Its earlier practices of supporting revolutionary bands and subversive activities had failed

miserably. After failing to achieve influence by revolutionary means and given the challenges of a new international environment (in particular the Sino-Soviet conflict), China developed a policy that was much more flexible. Influence was attained through the orthodox method of bilateral trade, and economic agreements. The change in tactics resulted in wide-scale African support which was not only instrumental in China's attainment of its U.N. seat but also assured unequivocal African support on many U.N. matters.

In the 1980s, China again underwent a foreign policy metamorphosis exemplified by the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, and *Four Principles of Economic and Technical Cooperation*. Domestically, China's focus had been on far-reaching economic reformation. The change in ideological tilt was transposed to the international sector. When nearly half of Africa's heads of state visited Beijing, the biggest challenge was to bring these countries into the stream of economic reform.

At the end of the 1980s, entering the 90s, China was faced with the international repercussions of the Tianamen Square incident, the cessation of the Cold War and the Gulf War. As self-proclaimed leader of the Third World, China's rhetoric was obliged to change. Thus South-to-South cooperation as well as economic reform had to be encouraged. The "new world order," or extension of capitalist free trade into previously socialist domains, would expose a greater need for capital for Third World development than China could provide. The emphasis that China is currently placing on building a Third World trade infrastructure for those nations who are excluded from development because of capital shortage is

both an opportunity and potentially the boldest bid that China has yet made in terms of constructing a vast and cohesive network of friendly nations.

III. CONTEMPORARY SINO-AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter examines contemporary Sino-African relations from 1990 to the present. These events have brought about dramatic changes in the international environment and may have far-reaching consequences for China as well as Africa. Of particular importance are 1) the ending of the Cold War, 2) the effect of the American victory in the Gulf War, 3) the American perception of the New World Order, and 4) renewed intensification in the North-South conflict.

A. THE EFFECTS OF THE ENDING COLD WAR ON SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

The ending of the Cold war has had a tremendous effect on Africa and Sino-African relations. With the ending of the Cold War African nations "felt marginalized by industrialized nations and has produced a post-colonial identity crisis for a continent long regarded as strategic"⁸¹ in the high stakes struggle between the superpowers. In addition, Africa's relationship with China was also undergoing a metamorphosis of sorts. China, facing international condemnation and economic sanctions as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident, had been forced to decrease the level of aid to African states. China's priority has been to husband its capital resources in an effort to keep its domestic economic agenda on track in the aftermath of the Tianamen incident. With the exception of loan/aid packages extended to the

⁸¹"The Gulf Crisis: Is This The Third World's War?" *Africa Report*, March-April 1991, 5-8.

Central African Republic, Algeria and Ethiopia and the restructuring of Zaire's debt,⁸² Chinese aid has become conspicuously absent following Tiananmen.

In essence there is a feeling of Africa "fatigue" in the international community. No longer an appropriate playing field for superpower surrogates, African has essentially been told to "Get your house in order. No longer a priority." African states can no longer expect to receive substantial financial or technical assistance from the West. Michael Chege (a Kenyan political scientist) for the Ford Foundation writes:

With the ending of the Cold War, African has lost whatever political luster it may have once had, and there are no compelling geostrategic or economic reasons to catapult it to the top of the global agenda.⁸³

B. THE EFFECTS OF THE GULF WAR ON SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

This may be changing. The Gulf War sent an uneasy message to China and African States. The willingness of the Western Powers to aggregate their military force and President George Bush's vision of "New World Order" is being viewed with fear and skepticism by China and the African States who see it as simply another face of neocolonialism.⁸⁴ The overwhelming majority of Third World nations share a common history of colonial exploitation. The significance of the Gulf War, when viewed from such a vantage, was not the containment of Iraqi aggression, but rather a full-scale

⁸²Segal, *op. cit.* p. 124-125.

⁸³Chege, M., "Remembering Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, no. 1, Winter, 1992, p. 156.

⁸⁴Segal, *op. cit.* p. 124-125.

cooperative effort on the part of the industrialized powers to protect western interest in what is still essentially a Western economic sphere of influence. The fact that virtually all the western nations and Japan participated in financing the Gulf War was seen as a testament to the economic interdependence of the Western economies and as a grim omen in regard to the willingness of the industrialized powers to protect their position of economic advantage and "right" to the resources of the world.

African states also fear that they will be left to perpetual economic ruin as what few capital resources that are available are redirected to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thereby further stifling their own aspirations and development strategies.⁸⁵

China recognizes the implications of the ever-shrinking pool of development capital and has called for greater South to South cooperation as the economic gap between North and South, rich vs. poor intensifies. Li Peng (Premier of the State Council) stated at the 5th session of the 7th National Peoples Congress on 20 March 1992:

International economic competition is growing bitter. Contradictions between North and South are becoming more pronounced Another key element if our foreign policy is to strengthen solidarity and cooperation between China and other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and our friendship and cooperation have been increasingly fruitful. The Chinese government supports the just struggle of South African people."⁸⁶

⁸⁵Versi, Anver, "1991 and All That," *New African*, Jan. 1992.

⁸⁶"Report on the Work of the Government. 5th Session of the Seventh National Peoples Congress on 20 March 1992," *Beijing Review*, April 13-19, 1992, p. I-XVI.

In China's view power politics and world hegemony is at an all-time high as "Western countries exert economic pressure on the Third World by linking their assistance with democracy and human rights."⁸⁷ Africa is a classic example and having abandoned the hopes of the 60s and 70s is now struggling for sheer survival.

The 1980s are known as the "lost decade for Africa" as its economy deteriorated and the number of severely underdeveloped countries rose from 16 to 28 between 1980 and 1989.⁸⁸ During the same period GDP stagnated and the economic growth rate dropped from 3.4% to -1.5% the resource balance declined as a percentage of GDP declined from 1.4% to -3.3%. The average annual growth rate further declined from -3.5% to -4.5%. In fact, Africa was the only region in the world not to experience per capital growth.⁸⁹ The percentage of African contribution to World Gross Product declined from 1.9% to 1.2%. In addition, Africa is still faced with an external debt that grew to approximately \$270 billion. 40% of Africa's export earnings are used to repay interest on that debt approximates \$500 million/year. All this while population growth has expanded at a rate of 3%, three times greater than the rate at which agricultural land is being put into production in order to feed the expanding population.⁹⁰

⁸⁷Ren, Sa, *Beijing Review*, "Third World Challenges and Opportunities," p. 12.

⁸⁸Zongde, Chen., "The Difficulties Confronting African Economic Adjustment in the 1990s." in *Contemporary African Economic and Political Development (The Second Sino-U.S. African Studies Conference)* p. 67.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Yongmin Pan, "OAU Urges Pool Efforts," *Beijing Review*, June 24-30, 1991, p. 12.

Moreover, from the period 1990 to present, more than half the African states have been mired in political, national, factional and territorial strife that have continued to cripple the economy. As a result the following leaders have fallen from power. (See Table 8.)

TABLE 8. FALLEN HEADS OF STATE

Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia)	Voted out	October 1991
Kengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia)	Fled	21 May 1991
Metsing Lekhanya (Lesotho)	Toppled	30 April 1991
Mouissa Traore (Mali)	Toppled	25 March 1991
Mathieu Kerkou (Benin)	Voted out	25 March 1991
Aristides Pereira (Cape Verde)	Voted out	17 February 1991
Siyad Barre (Somalia)	Fled	27 January 1991
Pinto Da Costa (Sao Tome)	Voted out	20 January 1991
Hissene Habre (Chad)	Fled	2 December 1991
Samuel Doe (Liberia)	Murdered	10 September 1990
Chadli Benedit (Algeria)	Replaced	June 1990
Sam Nujoma (Namibia)	Replaced	June 1990

Source: Compiled by author from *New Africa*, July 1991 and Riley S. "Democratic Transition in Africa," *Conflict Studies*, 1991, p. 27.

These challenges have forced African nations to seek new alternatives in development. Consequently several OAU, African Leadership Forum conferences have been convened to discuss problems, solutions, and set agendas for progress. In addition, African nations signed an agreement to develop an African Economic Community to promote economic integration and development.⁹¹

⁹¹Ibid., p. 13.

These developments have met with tacit approval in China as positive steps towards strengthening the economic position of the Third World.

If Third World nations strive to develop their national economies, strengthen South to South Cooperation, speed up North-South Dialogue, they will become a force in the international arena in the 1990s and a vital part of the world's effort to set up a new international Political and Economic Order.⁹²

China is fully aware that Africa supplies a significant proportion of the world's raw materials to industrialized nations, particularly Europe and Japan.⁹³ Because many of these African nations depend on these materials for their present economic survival and as the source of future investment capital, receiving fair market value is of great importance. Although African minerals play a fundamental role in the economic prosperity of the developed nations, there is insufficient direct investment back into African economies. The perception of a structural inequity in the trade practices currently and historically emplaced are fueling a pan-African consensus for demanding fairer trade policies. If a successful United Front is maintained, the industrialized nations will be forced to restructure trade agreements and practices. China realizes that only economic issues can get a North-South

⁹²*Beijing Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁹³Gerard Chaliand, "The Struggle for Africa" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 32-33. Percentage of raw materials are as follows: Diamonds (75%), gold (70%), cobalt (70%), vanadium (50%), platinum (46%), chrome (36%), mananese (30%), copper (20%), uranium (20%). Materials are mostly concentrated in the following areas: South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Zaire, the Maghreb, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria and Libya are rich in hydrocarbons, phosphates, iron and uranium.

dialogue started and that ultimately the issue of peaceful coexistence is dependent upon mutually beneficial economic interaction.⁹⁴

C. CHINA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The concept of a New World Order manipulated at the behest of the western powers is offensive to the Chinese leadership. The prospect of the Western Powers colluding to formulate an international order articulated by President George Bush "where diverse nations are drawn together in a common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law. ... America was the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace"⁹⁵ is threatening to China, which views it as a manifestation of neocolonialism.⁹⁶

China hopes to foster the development of an entirely different type of "New World Order." As early as 1988, Deng Xiaoping stated:

I recommend that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which was formulated by us Asians in the 1950s should serve as the norms for the new international order for a very long period of time.⁹⁷

China views these principles as the norms that should guide future international relations to attain peace and development. The Five Principles are as follows:

⁹⁴Xu, *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁹⁵Tucker, Robert and David Henderson, "The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and American Purpose," (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1972), p. 30.

⁹⁶Segal. *op.cit.*, p. 124-125.

⁹⁷Zhenhuang, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

- Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
- Mutual nonaggression
- Noninterference in each others' internal affairs
- Equality and mutual benefit
- Peaceful coexistence.

China vehemently rejects the concept of the New World Order as formulated by President George Bush. China's perception is that it is a "New World Order" dominated by a tripolar U.S.-Western Europe-Japan coalition which supports U.S. hegemonic aspirations and uses democratization and the human rights issue as a condition for economic cooperation.⁹⁸ China maintains that a viable New World Order should take the needs and interests of all the nations in the world into consideration and that it should not be based on power politics and the continued exploitation of the developing nations of the "Third World." Thus a "fair and rational new international order in which all nations, big or small, will participate" should be the aim.⁹⁹

Li Peng at the UN Security Summit in January 1992 stated:

... in our view, such basic principles as sovereign equality of member states and noninterference in their internal affairs ... should be observed by all its members without exception. All countries, big, small, weak, rich or poor, are entitled to participate in world affairs as equal members of the community and make their own contributions toward peace and development.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸Jiron, Zhou "Transitional World Structure of the 1990s and its Impact on the Establishment of the New International Order." *China Institute of Contemporary International Relations*, October 1991.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁰"Li Peng Addresses Summit," full text of speech by Li Peng at UN Security Summit, 31 January 1992, *FBIS* 3 February 1992 from *RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS EDITION*.

In an interview Li Peng went on to say:

China believes the future new international political and economic order should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It would be dangerous for one or several countries to lead the world. We consider that all countries, big or small, rich or poor, and strong or weak, are equal members of the world family, should enjoy equal rights to peace and development of the world and should fulfill their own duties. We also consider that the United Nations should play a greater role in the future new international order.¹⁰¹

1. Diplomatic Offensive

China has undertaken a pragmatic diplomatic offensive seeking to parlay its primacy in the Third World and veto power in the United Nations into a position where it can take a significant role in shaping this "New World Order." Of the 165 members of the United Nations 130 are deemed to be developing nations. This may well explain why China favors an increased role for the UN in defining the nature and working structure of the New World Order. The Tiananmen Square incident left China in virtual isolation and as a result went from being pursued as a trade partner to being a pursuer. China's present objective is to establish a network of trade partners that will eventually alleviate dependence on U.S. markets and/or goodwill for achieving their economic goals.

In a six-month period (July 1991 through January 1992) Chinese Premier Li Peng visited six Middle Eastern nations (Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Kuwait). In January 1992, Foreign minister Qian Qichen visited six subsaharan African nations (Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Ivory Coast,

¹⁰¹Li Peng, "Li Peng on Domestic and World Issues," interview by Mario Vasquez, *Beijing Review*, July 1991, p. 27.

Ghana, and Namibia, including a stopover in South Africa), and established diplomatic ties with Israel.¹⁰² In addition Li Peng also visited members of the EC (Italy, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain.)

The primary objective of Li Peng's diplomatic initiative was to rebuff what he views as the advance of U.S. hegemony by rallying support for a "New World Order" based on the Five Principles and South to South cooperation.¹⁰³ Chinese leaders also centered discussions around the international economic situation and debt burdens which are completely crippling the developing nations thereby widening the gap between North and South nations. "They believe that the unreasonable situation must be changed as soon as possible. For this purpose, the South to South cooperation must first be strengthened to realize effective dialogues between the South and the North."¹⁰⁴ In China's view what is needed is a broad united front economic strategy designed to challenge the economic supremacy of the North. China feels that it has consolidated its position, having stood its ground after Tianamen and world isolation. In an effort at least partly motivated by the desire to project a more progressive world image, China has enhanced its global acceptance by participating in the peace settlements in Cambodia and Namibia. Now China is accelerating its evolution toward political moderation by using its diplomatic influence to pursue its primary

¹⁰²Xiadong, Zhang, "Time to End Middle Instability," *Beijing Review*, 22 July 1991, pp. 13-14 and "Qian Winds up African Tour," *Beijing Review*, 3-16 February 1992, p. 8 and FBIS-CHI-92-013, 21 January 1992, pp. 17-20.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Xiaodong, cpcit., p. 14.

objective of strengthening its domestic economy. Improving trade, developing new markets, luring foreign investment and technology transference are the top priorities of China's trade and foreign policies.

China is also seeking support for observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as well as reentry into GATT. China also hopes to play an expanded role as arbiter of international affairs and peaceful conflict resolution.

2. Arms Sales

The issue of China's proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology to Third world nations is a source of contention between China and the West. China has emerged as the third largest exporter of arms after the United States and the former Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ China's emergence as a major arms exporter coincides with the U.S. exchange of high technology to Beijing. While the United States was selling sophisticated weaponry to China, China became the primary supplier of sophisticated weaponry at bargain basement prices to the Third World. Beijing relies heavily on its arms sales to support its own arms industry, develop new weaponry and gain influence in those regions.¹⁰⁶

The most significant commerce involves sales of ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia (\$2-3 billion), M 11 missiles to Pakistan, M9 missiles to Syria and

¹⁰⁵Pear, Robert, "U.S. Ranked No. 1 in Weapons Sales," *New York Times*, 10 August 1991, p. 10.

¹⁰⁶Marie, Gottschalk, "The Failure of American Policy," *World Policy Journal*, 4 (Fall 1989), p. 6670.

a 15 megawatt nuclear reactor to Algeria.¹⁰⁷ Attempts to curb missile proliferation have failed despite the fact China has declared its willingness to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) "in principle" and entertain the possibility of joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).¹⁰⁸ Moreover, China is modernizing its military machine, seeking to construct a military capable of projecting power far beyond the adjacent geography. Emphasis has been placed on developing or buying air refueling capability and expanding its Navy, with plans for building an aircraft carrier. In addition China has increased its long-range deployments and exercises. This military buildup should make China a formidable regional force in the near future.¹⁰⁹

China resents the pressure tactics and patronizing attitude of the United States represented by linkage of arms sales and human rights issues with renewal of Most Favored Nation status. President Yang Shankun in an interview with *U.S. News and World Report* stated:

American opinion censures us for selling weapons. Yet why does it not censure itself? Many of the weapons in the Middle East are American. So there is a question of fairness here ... China has a saying, "only magistrates are allowed to set fires. Ordinary people are not allowed to light lights ... so we ask Americans to understand the Chinese peoples' frame of mind. China has a psychology that is very important. The more pressure you apply, the less China will give in. If you speak

¹⁰⁷Sheryl WuDunn, "China Backs Pact on Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, 11 August 1991, p. A1, Nicholas D. Kristoff, "Potent Office Weaves Web in China's Arms," *New York Times*, 21 August 1991, p. A4 and Susan Lawrence, "Inside Beijing's Arms Bazaar," *U.S. News and World Report*, 22 July 1991, pp. 37-38.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*

reasonably, if you explain your reasons clearly, China might agree. If you resort to high pressure, however, it will be counterproductive.¹¹⁰

The often sanctimonious rhetoric of the U.S. is particularly aggravating to China and the Third World in light of the fact that the severe economic deterioration the Third World experienced during the last decade directly coincides with the growth in U.S. debt, which grew from \$1 trillion to \$4 trillion in the same decade, effectively absorbing much development capital that would otherwise have been available to underdeveloped nations.

Faced with paucity of hard capital China will continue to export arms as a means of meeting strategic and political objectives: gaining influence, recognition as the unequivocal and true leader of the Third World and a legitimate global power. The underground nuclear detonation that took place in China in May of 1992 is further evidence that the Chinese leadership regards the present as a time for self-assertion and is far more concerned with establishing China's military credibility than with the consequences or censure of American opinion.

D. SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS AND NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT SINCE 1990

The motif most frequently articulated by China is the need for increased North-South dialogue, South to South cooperation and a New World Order

¹⁰⁹Kristoff, "China Looks at World Order," *New York Times*, p. A1 Tai Meng Cheung, "Defense: Counter Marketing," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 August 1991, p. 30-31.

¹¹⁰President Yang Shankung, interviewed by Mortimer Auckerman in *U.S. News and World Report: The U.S. Also Sells Weapons*, 27 May 1991, p. 43.

that encompasses "both political and economic aspects."¹¹¹ The North-South dialogue is the brainchild of the Group of 77. In 1974 the United Nations adopted the *Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order*.¹¹² Its intent was to negotiate "changes in the global economic system in order to make it more equitable and more supportive of development"¹¹³ in Third World nations. The prospects for a meaningful North-South dialogue gained momentum in the period 1974-1979 as a result of the oil crisis in 1973. The South Commission reports:

It was undoubtedly spurred by the fear of the developed countries that the newly found assertiveness of the South after the rise of oil prices could lead to a damaging confrontation.¹¹⁴

At the time the South has some leverage with which to negotiate. Once the leverage disappeared, the northern developed nations abruptly lost interest in the ways they might assist economic development in the southern nations.

In effect meaningful North-South negotiations ended at the conference (UNCTAD) in Manila ... By that time there had been an ideological shift in the governments of some leading countries of the North. In addition the governments of most of the countries of the North had become preoccupied with fighting inflation at home, and gave no priority to

¹¹¹Xu, Han, "New World Order: A Chinese Perspective," *Beijing Review*, Sep. 9-15 1991, Pp. 31-34, and Li, Luye, "UN Role in Establishing a New World Order," *Beijing Review*, 30 September to 6 October 1991, pp. 12-16.

¹¹²*Ibid.*

¹¹³*Challenge to the South. The Report of the South Commission*, London: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 217.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 217.

agreeing on a new basis for North-South economic relations or to defining the nature, scope and prospects of interdependence.¹¹⁵

Many of the countries in the South (Third World) suffer from a multitude of problems. What the vast majority of the nations of the southern hemisphere have in common is endemic structural poverty that is the direct result of inadequate capitalization and an absence of the type of investment that has wide-spread ramifications and long-term benefits, i.e., reinvestment of profit in local economies that would serve as the basis of capital dispersion and formation. As nations in the North gravitated to high-tech industrialization and stockpiling, the need for raw materials declined by one-third and severely damaged those few Southern economies that had finally gained autonomy over their own resources. Moreover, the high debt accrued by Third World nations, particularly in Africa, preclude sustained economic development. More than 40% of Africa's annual export earnings are used to service its foreign debt.¹¹⁶

At the first North-South Roundtable Conference held in Abidjan 8-9 July 1991, Jean Pierre Boudier, Executive Director of the World Bank said that "developing countries had paid to the North more than it was receiving in loans, grants or investments."¹¹⁷ The Chinese leadership maintains that such imbalances are the "root cause" of social instability in the South and will ultimately lead to armed conflict. "In the absence of economic development

¹¹⁵*Challenge to the South, op. cit.*, p. 217.

¹¹⁶Dzisah Melvis, "Reduce Our Debt," *New African*, October 1991, p. 31.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

there will be no genuine peace and stability in the world."¹¹⁸ China rejects the explanation that poverty in Africa is a direct result of African failure to practice democracy and embrace capitalist ideals, asserting rather that the major problem is the exploitation and unfair trade practices employed by the North.¹¹⁹ Li Peng, in speaking on the issue of global North-South conflict has stated "developed countries should do more and take on more responsibility for narrowing the gap, adopt a more tolerant attitude towards debt, practice exchange of equal values in trade and attach no political strings."¹²⁰

On 8 July 1991 Chairman of the South Commission and ex-President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, was in China and presented Li Peng with the Chinese edition of *Challenge to the South*. The report was a culmination of three years work by the South Commission (formed in 1987) to which China donated \$400,000. The report is a comprehensive review and analysis of the development and underdevelopment of countries in the Southern hemisphere. The commission emphasizes the need for Third world nations to intensify their struggle for self-reliance, social justice and solidarity among themselves. The report notes that "despite its great promise and natural resources the Third World has not benefitted from world prosperity."¹²¹ Despite the developing world's technological progress and vast proliferation

¹¹⁸Luye, Li, "UN Role in Establishing a New World Order," *Beijing Review*, September 30 to 6 October 1991, p. 13. Li Luy is the Director-General of the China Center for International Studies and has been China's personal representative for the United Nations.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹²⁰Li Peng, *op.cit.*, July 1991, p. 27.

¹²¹*Challenge to the South, op. cit.*, p. 218.

of consumer goods, 75% of the world's population (.35 billion are living at or below minimum human subsistence."

The report also addresses the cause of underdevelopment, inadequate economic infrastructure and lack of education being primary among them. The report is critical of economic and financial arrangements that were clearly designed to foster the interests of the developed countries at the expense of the Third World.

Carrying the theme of inequity on to its logical conclusion, the report advocates the formation of an alliance between the least developed countries and would declare an end to debt repayment within the present terms thereby the developed nations to renegotiate the terms of the debts. The point raised in *Challenge to the South* reinforce the ideology and rhetoric that China has long been exposed to concerning the Third World. Now it seems the Third World has embraced it and is now ready to make changes.

E. NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP

There is much speculation as to what the effect of a change in leadership will have on the implementation of its foreign policy. The logical guess is very little. Regardless of who ascends to power the emphasis will continue to be on economic reform. As Harry Harding said in, *The Fragile Relationship*

The most important development to occur in China in the 1980's was the program of economic reform and international engagement Rooted in the realization that China could not become a modern powerful nation let alone keep up with the rest of Asia-Pacific region¹²²

¹²²Harding, Harry, *The Fragile Relationship* 1992, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

China's challenge will be to press ahead with its own development. China is leery to develop *full* economic interdependence with the U.S. and Japan. Thus it will seek to establish access to markets in the Third World, including Africa. The prospect of a Free South Africa is extremely appealing to both China and Africa. Moreover as mentioned above, African nations have agreed to regional economic integration. Clearly, Chinese diplomatic actions are aimed at long-term rewards. As such, China will continue to perform in a pragmatic fashion internationally in order to achieve its goal of wealth, influence, prestige and most importantly, global power status. But it will have to be within the limits of its own capabilities.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Historical judgment will undoubtedly single out the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as being the key events of the previous decade. The Gulf War was looked upon as the herald of a "New World Order." Ironically, however, another war perhaps even more threatening to coexistence and world peace was initiated, though its beginning went completely unnoticed. As of yet, it is a secret war of global proportion, a war of capital deprivation between the Haves and Have Nots.

As with all wars, the root causes have long historical pedigree but the precipitating event of the new Cold War was the monumental growth in U.S. debt, the ramifications of which have driven the majority of underdeveloped nations to the brink of desperation.

Viewed from the perspective of the Have Nots, the actions and policies of the U.S. government in regard to the national debt have two possible interpretations. The first is that the mechanisms of responsible government inside the U.S. have simply broken down and the rest of the interdependent industrial economies have had little choice but to underwrite the growing deficits in order to protect their own investments and insure the continued prosperity of the developed nations as a whole. A collapse of the American economy would have disastrous effects throughout the developed and developing world. A second, and more ominous interpretation is that the developed nations, especially Japan and Germany, which are the primary sources of American debt support, have been more than willing to funnel their surplus investment capital into the U.S. treasury precisely because of the

predictable effect it would have on Third World nations. Countries in the grip of starvation and economic chaos have little leverage when haggling over the price of their resources.¹²³ Whichever view one subscribes to makes little difference, the fact remains that the prospect a "New World Order" wherein the developed nations employ military cooperation and economic collusion as a means of gaining maximum and unchallenged advantage over the Third World is quite literally life-threatening to the peoples of the underdeveloped nations.

A world-wide shortage of capital and/or its inequitable distribution had already become a global crisis before the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its client states. The current efforts of the Eastern European and Central Asian countries to develop capitalist economies can only have the effect of greatly accelerating the economic decline of the underdeveloped nations. The fact that industrial infrastructures exist in much of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc make them more competitive as receptacles for investment. Geographic proximity and deep historical ties are also important factors in their ability to attract capital at the expense of southern hemisphere development.

Inasmuch as the decade of the 1980s witnessed the collapse of "communism" inside the Soviet Union, it also bore witness to the failure of "socialism and one-party rule" on the African subcontinent. Though no alternative "ism" per se has yet been embraced by the African peoples, the

¹²³Greenhouse, Steven, "U.S. and World: A New Economic Order is Ahead," *New York Times*, 28 April 1992, A1.

rhetoric and concept of South and South cooperation, as espoused and formulated by the Chinese leadership, appears to be a logical and perhaps the singular course of action available for many in the Third World as an alternative to a new cycle of colonial rule and exploitation.

A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA

For the last 40 years United States foreign policy towards Africa has been defined within the strategic context of the East-West struggle. U.S. interest was contingent on the perceived or real threat of its monolithic adversary, the Soviet Union.

Priority was given to those nations which exhibited strategic value, served strategic interests and were on the pro-Western side of the East-West ideological struggle. The primary objective was to contain Soviet geostrategic maneuvering. Africa did not figure into the overall scheme of Western economic development strategy. Both overall direct U.S. investment and exports to Africa hovered somewhere around three percent of U.S. total international investment. However, Africa is a leading source of the world's raw materials and mineral resources. Consequently the concerns of U.S. policy makers focused on the vulnerability of strategic choke points which go through the Indian Ocean and pass by the Cape of Good Hope to the Atlantic. (See Figure 1) Virtually all of Europe's oil and a significant amount of U.S. oil is transported through these shipping lanes. Blockage of these lanes would result in economic hardship of vast proportions. The same is true for the Horn of Africa where oil tankers move from the Persian Gulf through the

Africa




Figure 1. Map of Africa—Strategic Choke Points

Red Sea and on to the Suez Canal. As a result of these concerns certain "marriages of convenience" with a number of corrupt despots emerged. Strategically important countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, Mozambique, and Liberia embodied everything the U.S. supposedly opposed, lack of democratic rule, repression, human rights infractions, as well as plundering and mismanagement on the part of the leadership. Yet the U.S. consistently ignored injustices to protect its interests and those of its allies in the West.

As a result of competition between the Superpowers, regional conflicts and internal struggles were magnified and masked within a Cold War context. "The end of the Cold War," President Bush said in *National Security Strategy of the United States*, "should benefit Africa in that it will no longer be seen as a battle ground for superpower conflict. In a world of peace, more attention and resources should be freed to help the world's poorest ... Concepts of democracy and market economies must be applied in a continent where initially these concepts were rejected because socialism was fashionable ... Benign neglect will not suffice."¹²⁴

In contrast to Presidential and State Department rhetoric, the U.S. has persisted in following a policy (with the exception of the South African region) where Africa is low on the totem pole of priorities. Dictatorial rulers such as Mobuto (Zaire), Barre (Somalia) and Moi (Kenya) whose government were once propped up and were the recipients of substantial U.S. aid have now been told to get their houses in order, make democratic reforms

¹²⁴*National Security Strategy of the United States*, August 1991, pp. 10-11.

and/or step down.¹²⁵ To make matters worse, the national treasuries of a number of the previously U.S.-backed countries have virtually been looted with the full knowledge for the West. A prime example is Zaire whose ruler, Mobuto, is alleged to have amassed a personal fortune worth \$6 billion, half the size of the national debt (\$12 billion).¹²⁶ Africa is being seemingly abandoned. If not for the pressure of the Congressional Black Caucus and the TransAfrica lobby, Africa might possibly be deleted from the map of U.S. concerns entirely.

In April, the U.S. advocated a sharp reduction in United Nations Peacekeeping forces being deployed in wartorn Somalia.¹²⁷ In fact the "Horn of Plenty is now the Horn of Misery." Drought, famine and civil wars plague the countries of Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, threatening the lives of 23 million people. Central Africa is beset with epidemic AIDS and has little to offer in medical facilities and treatment.

To the West, Nigeria, the continent's most prosperous state, is experiencing social unrest as the result of religious conflict between Islamic and Christian forces. Liberia has also experienced recent political unrest which resulted in the death of Samuel Doe and substantial internal turmoil. Western Sahara is mired in a factional war with Morocco. In North Africa, Libya was just targeted with U.S.-sponsored sanctions. Southern Africa shows

¹²⁵Noble, Kenneth B., "U.S. Reaping Zairians' Anger toward Mobuto," *New York Times*, 30 March 1992.

¹²⁶Cowell, Alan. "Magic and Decay," *New York Times Magazine*, 5 April 1992, pp. 31-38.

¹²⁷Perlez, Jane. "Stranded by Superpowers, Africa Seeks an Identity," *New York Times*, 17 May 1992, p. A1.

the most promise of regional economic and social progress as a result of the reforms recently instituted in Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia.

Despite the generally calamitous conditions, the U.S. needs to revamp its foreign policy with regard to Africa. While it is true that Africa is a conflict-prone region at this juncture in time, much of its conflict is a direct result of its racist colonial past. When the European colonial powers withdrew from their holdings no attempt was made to re-draw national boundaries that would reflect the realities of cultural and historical bands and/or rivalries. The newly independent states had little prospect of quickly becoming viable homogeneous nations. As a consequence, what has arisen has been tribal conflict and foreign-sponsored dictatorships. Nationalism became an obstacle not a goal.¹²⁸ Though independent from colonial rule, the legacy bequeathed by the European powers has left Africa to suffer in disarray.

There are, however, some very real geopolitical and economic trends beginning to develop that could have far-reaching consequences. In order to be effective, the post-Cold War U.S. policy should be one based more on genuine partnership for development and less on geopolitical and strategic concerns. There is presently an opportunity for the United States to show authentic leadership in world affairs that extends beyond the boundaries of the industrialized nations and forge a relationship that is beneficial for both

¹²⁸Ochola, Samuel Agonda, *Minerals in African Underdevelopment*, (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications Limited), 1975, p. 1-9.

European powers divided up the continent at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85. At this time it was acquiesced that a European State could legally claim any territory that was effectively occupied. Consequently, the divisions were instituted irregardless of tribal borders which resulted in conflict. (i.e., indigenous Somalians live in four different states.)

sides. Yet the opportunity may be proven to be evanescent. Michael Clough, a former professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, and an Africanist at the Council of Foreign Relations conveys some reasons why in his book, *Free at Last?*

One reason is that the Bush Administration has failed to provide any leadership on African Issues. Neither the President nor any of his senior foreign advisers has displayed any real interest in the continent. Instead they have delegated responsibility for policy toward Africa to mid-level officials with limited vision and no domestic political base. These officials operate with considerable latitude so long as they heed three injunctions: 'Don't spend too much money. Don't take stands that might create domestic controversies. Don't let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world.'¹²⁹

Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan Administration, Chester Crocker, supports this assessment. Speaking to *Africa Confidential* he said, "Most secretaries of state have just wanted to keep African issues off their desk ... the idea of putting big money into African economic development remains an anathema."¹³⁰ Lacking any set of far-reaching goals or policy objectives, the major theme of U.S. foreign policy has been to use the carrot/stick approach to promote increased democratization.

B. THE PUSH FOR DEMOCRACY

In 1990, the U.S. put its African friends on notice that all future aid would be tied to democratic and human rights reforms. In speaking about democracy at the African-American Institute, Assistant Secretary Cohen said

¹²⁹Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹³⁰"USA/Africa: Policy? What Policy?", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 11 January 1991, p. 1.

in 1991, "... We sincerely believe it is the only way that African people can bring about happiness in the long run."¹³¹

At an address at the Voice of America symposium, in September 1991 he said,

Equally important, we are making clear the link between political liberalization and outside assistance. We will help countries pursue a democratic course and those already with democratic systems. In an era of escalating demand for scarce sources, we cannot waste non-humanitarian assistance on governments which refuse the path to democracy.¹³²

Even Julius Nyerere, elder statesman and former socialist president of Tanzania, admits serious mistakes were made in Africa. At the African Leadership Forum he told other African heads of state, "The worst deficit we have is the deficit of democracy. We thought we could develop without involving the people."¹³³

African nations are ready to take full responsibility for themselves and seek African solutions to African problems. Democratic electoral systems, good governance, and a market economy are the desires of most African peoples. But the reality is that being "democratic" is unlikely to improve their economic positions or living conditions. Acquiescing to U.S. demands will not translate into increased aid but rather continuation or even decrease of existing levels of U.S. aid. Simply put, the African states are going to have

¹³¹Cohen, Herman J., *Africa and Democracy*, U.S. Department of State, 2 December 1991, Volume 2, No. 48, p. 871.

¹³²Cohen, Herman J., *Democratization in Africa*, address before the Voice of America Symposium, Washington, DC, September 17, 1991, U.S. Department of State Dispatch.

¹³³Versi, Anver, "Back to the Future," *New African*, July 1991, p. 10.

to run faster to remain in the same place. Democratic values and commitments may be difficult to sustain in the face of growing western trade protectionism, competition from newly industrialized states, a history of authoritarian colonial and post-independence rule, in a context of continued scarcity of resources and ethnic strife.¹³⁴

C. EFFECT OF CHINESE INITIATIVES ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

China will almost certainly emerge as a global power in the 21st Century. As such, it could become a threat to American interests at some point in time. At present China's consuming priority is to protect its national interest through establishing stability, economic growth, and "building socialism with Chinese characteristics,"¹³⁵

The Gulf and the Cold War have brought about a new set of relationships for the entire world. While the industrialized nations are redefining relations with African nations, China is doing the same. However, China is taking an entirely different approach. The Chinese view this period as a window of opportunity to gain friends and influence in the international arena. China's objective is to create a mechanism of influence that extends over the entire African continent.

Learning from their past experience, it is not China's objective to establish relationships based on political ideology. Rather China seeks relationships based on mutual economic benefit. China combines the pragmatic, visionary

¹³⁴Riley, Stephen P., *The Democratic Transition in Africa: An End to the One-party State*, p. 30.

¹³⁵Li Peng, *China's Foreign Relations*, *Beijing Review*, 23-29, September 1991.

and patient in its approach. Africa's potential for growth, strategic and raw materials and the lure of new markets act as magnets for Chinese ambitions for global expansion.

The goals of China's initiatives in Africa may ultimately be achieved for a rather simple reason, and that is that the United States underestimates the importance of China in Asia and pays too little attention to long-run considerations. Rep. Les Aspin has even put China on the list of potential conventional targets. The United States should show China more respect.

Just as "The Powers That Be" consistently underestimate the importance of China in Asia, they likewise do the same in Africa. In fact in a draft of a strategy document leaked to the *New York Times*, 8 March 1992 which focused on regional contingencies and conflicts, neither China nor Africa was mentioned.¹³⁶ If even potential existed for regional conflict it will surely be in this strategically vital part of the world. Besides the ever-present problem of economic development, one of the greatest threats to the region is the permeation of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the African continent.¹³⁷ (See Map #2). China, cognizant of the potential for conflict the Islamic issue represents, has attempted to at least show tolerance by allowing Chinese Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and opening its own mosques in China.

¹³⁶Tyler, Patrick E., "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop." *New York Times*, 8 March 1992, p. A1.

¹³⁷Milner, Judith, "The Islamic Wave," *New York Times Magazine*, 31 May 1992, pp. 23-43.




Figure 2. Spread of Islamic Fundamentalism

The fact that China no longer has to frame its dealings with African nations in the context of the Cold War is of considerable benefit to Chinese interests. Gone are the days of outright grants. Further aid is surely to be based on mutual benefit and economic interdependence. Since Africa is, as the director of the Inter Africa Group, Abdul Mohammed, expressed, "The only region where you have B.C., A.D. and the Twenty-first Century" all in one;¹³⁸ it is a perfect market for the export of low-level technology, that is relatively simple to operate and maintain.

It may be somewhat misleading, however, to characterize the future of Sino-African trade as being solely focused on the exchange of "low-level" technology and equipment. The electronics and computer industries in China are currently producing some products of sufficient quality to stand up to open competition with Japanese and Western manufacturers. China is somewhat unique in this regard, spanning the entire scale of technological and industrial manufacture, which is also a very positive attribute in terms of building trade with Africa.

The development of Sino-African trade need not pose any threat to the interests of the United States. It would be advantageous, however, for the U.S. to expand its trade with China as a means of curtailing an inordinate dependence on building a defense industry as a primary mechanism of employment, industrialization and trade. Roughly 70 percent of the Chinese population is still rural and/or agrarian and living far below the standards the Communist Party wants to achieve. The willingness of the gerontocracy

¹³⁸Perlez, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

to initiate the radical economic reforms of the last 10 years is ample illustration of the risks the party is willing to take in order to accelerate development and raise the standard of living. The manufacture and proliferation of high-tech weaponry is too profitable for the Chinese to abstain from but U.S. trade policy will undoubtedly be a crucial factor in determining the scale of manufacture and the subsequent effects.

D. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

A final consideration in the development and interplay between Chinese and American versions of the New World Order is the relative stature and position support each can control and solidify in the U.N. China believes that the U.N. should play a significant role in the implementation of the "New World Order." China's diplomatic offensive and self-proclamation as the de facto leader of the "Third World" is in great part designed to solidify Afro-Asian/Third World bloc voting in the General Assembly which would then have the capacity to undercut policies that are disadvantageous to its coalition. Any issue strongly favored by the Assembly is almost certain to be adopted, in spite of American opposition, as was the 1974 vote to expel South Africa.¹³⁹ If the U.S. is going to conform to the United Nations as an instrument and forum for the implementation of its policies, then it must work to establish broad-based support that is inclusive of African and Chinese interests.

¹³⁹Luye, op cit., p. 121.

China will likely emerge as a global power in the 21st Century. With South to South Cooperation and relative apathy by the West towards African in particular and Third World nations in general, China's economic interaction with Third World countries will certainly grow. Within a framework of economic interdependence Chinese influence in the region will be greatly expanded, thereby challenging Western supremacy. Yes, Africa has its share of problems but steps are being taken to alleviate and/or solve them. Africans have read the handwriting on the wall. As they strive toward regional solidarity and economic prosperity, the United States may find itself on the outside of a formidable economic and political development that has the ability to affect world agendas.

China on the other hand will have solidified its influence in one of the most vitally strategic regions in the world and gained a venue to project the power of its growing navy under the auspices of the *Five Principles of Coexistence*. If South-to-South cooperation is successful and the result is a more equitable distribution of wealth, they will have achieved their goal of becoming a global power.

In light of these facts, this thesis will conclude with recommendations for policies that I believe will be in the best interests of Africa, China and the United States.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. What is in the Best Interest of Africa

After enduring a history of slavery, colonialism and oppression, Africa is at a crossroads and must chart its own course and destiny. No longer

a political or strategic interest to Western nations, African problems will have to and should be solved amongst themselves. Thus the priority should be the cessation of civil wars that are raging in such nations as Liberia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Angola. A more peaceful Africa will result in an economically integrated Africa. An economically integrated Africa will result in a more prosperous Africa.

Africa's move to democracy, dismantling of Apartheid, development of the new African economic market and setting of agenda's to alleviate poverty and stimulate growth are encouraging developments. Clearly, full political/economic integration and interdependence will be beneficial for the entire region. As South African President de Klerk communicated on his visit to several African nations in August 1991: "Trade not aid is the answer to Africa's economic problems." With regional economic powerhouses such as South Africa and Nigeria working in harmony, prospects for technological medical and agricultural exchange and development should be promising. This in turn would lead to self sufficiency. A more self-sufficient Africa would become less of a burden to Western economies.

Economic prosperity combined with its influential voice in the international forums could make Africa a force to be reckoned with. Africa accounts for nearly 1/3 of UN votes (50) and has a tendency to vote in blocs not only in the General Assembly but in other Third World organizations such as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), UNCTAD and the Group of 77. This reality could impede or aid foreign policy initiatives of more powerful northern states.

Clearly the problems in Africa will not be solved over night but if it remains poor, unstable, underdeveloped and undemocratic it may dissipate into relative obscurity. The solution then becomes for Africa to pool its resources and develop a united front. Africa must meet the challenge to save itself because if they do not do it no one else will.

2. What is in the Best Interest of China?

With the end of the Cold War and the implications of the Gulf War the strategic triangle (U.S.-China-Soviet) has dissipated. While the Chinese government has publicly stated that cultivating improved relations with the U.S. is of extreme importance, China has also made it clear that a healthy relationship is based on mutual respect, the five principles of coexistence and the three joint communiques—the 1972 Shanghai communique, the 1979 Communique establishing diplomatic relations, and the 1982 Communique on Arms Sales to Taiwan. As Li Peng conveyed:

As long as the two sides strictly abide by the principles contained in their three Joint Communiques the existing obstacles can be removed and Sino-U.S. relations further improved.¹⁴⁰

Overall Chinese foreign policy is on the upbeat as can be seen by the following facts. The Chinese have not modified their policies on arms sales, human rights issues, and unfair trade practices and detonation of a nuclear weapon, in spite of threatened retaliation. They have resumed friendly relations with Japan, the states of the former Soviet Union and Israel, soon to be followed by diplomatic relations with South Africa. China is also a full

¹⁴⁰Li Peng, *op. cit.*, 1992, p. xvi.

participant in the Middle East Peace Conference and the Paris Peace Accord (Cambodia), and still continues to enjoy Most Favored Nation status (MFN) with the United States.

Clearly, China is looking to the Twenty-first Century with optimism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and a peaceful environment, there is a "window of opportunity" to truly become the leader of the Third World, perhaps fill the power gap and become a world power. With the political support of Third World Nations, renewed South-to-South cooperation, acceleration of the North-South economic gap, increased trade interdependence and arms sales to various regions; China should be able to achieve both strategic and political goals of becoming recognized as a world power. Thus it is in China's best interest at this time to continue with economic reform, pursue its independent foreign policy of peace and contribute to the maintenance of a stable international environment.

3. What is in the Best Interests of the United States?

The Sino-African connection is a reality and prospects for economic interdependence based on "cooperation and mutual benefits" may result in far-reaching effects. Now that the Cold War is over the United States must not forget Africa nor ignore the African challenges of debt, AIDS, refugees, hunger, despots and human rights. Benign neglect, economic stagnation, and heightened poverty may result in the reemergence and perpetuation of despots.

Some African nations have proven thus far that they are willing to move towards democracy and economic development. Although there is no prospect of a Marshall Plan for all of Africa, the U.S. could help in the area of

transference of technological and agricultural know-how to help bring about a better way of life. More U.S. Aid (hard cash) is not necessarily the answer. Much of U.S. aid in the past consisted of machinery, arms and money that conveniently found its way into the pockets of repressive despots. The "aid" never reached or aided the people it was intended for—that being the common person/peasant. I agree with Michael Clough who advocates channeling subsequent aid through independent nongovernmental agencies. Clough also calls for the mobilization of what he designates as "the third sector" or those non- government organizations (NGO'S) interested in the development of Africa.¹⁴¹ It is imperative that the U.S. reconcile the needs of Africa within the context of its own global interests. An effective manner in which to achieve this is to utilize the knowledge and expertise of special interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), the Ford Foundation and TransAfrica. While there are other agencies involved in the region, it is their efforts that effectively have influenced U.S foreign policy towards Africa.

No two organizations have done more to effect change in Africa than Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and TransAfrica. From the time of CBC's inception in 1971, it was clear that the scope of their concerns would include foreign policy. TransAfrica an African-American lobby was formed in 1977 with an objective to form a progressive United States foreign policy towards Africa in General and South Africa's Apartheid system in particular. Together they were instrumental in garnering enough support to effectively

¹⁴¹Clough, *op. cit.*, 119-120.

override former President Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Apartheid Act of 1986. Clearly these sanctions were the strongest by any nation and were responsible for the positive changes taken place in South Africa today. In addition, the CBC has also spoken out against the repressive regimes and Human Right violators in Liberia, Zaire and Ethiopia.

The Ford Foundation founded in 1913 is another non-profit institution whose programs are international in scope. Moreover, the Ford Foundation acts as an Transnational actor with the real ability to influence foreign policy.¹⁴² Its objective is to facilitate the causes of war and strengthen the development of democracies in third World Nations particularly Africa and Asia.

It is the Ford foundation that sponsors both African and Chinese students at American Universities. In 1988, the Ford Foundation sponsored the first U.S.-China African Studies conference in Beijing.¹⁴³ Since then the US-African Studies Exchange Committee has been formed. George Yu writes:

With Africa as its intellectual focus the Committee has brought together American and Chinese Africanist from universities and institutions in the United States and China to discuss and examine topics of common interest... Several levels of formal academic exchanges have been conducted, including lecture visits to Chinese institutions by American Africanist and research/study in the United States followed by field work in Africa by Chinese Scholars. At least three parties benefit African, Americans and Chinese.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴²Bennett, A. Leroy. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall), 1991, p. 262.

¹⁴³Conversation with Professor Carl Rosberg at the University of Berkeley, 8 April 1992.

¹⁴⁴Yu, George, *Contemporary African Op. Cit.*, 1991, p. 1.

Keeping the lines of communication open with both Africa and China is vital to fostering healthy relations. President Bush's decision to renew most favored nation status was the right thing to do in dealing with China. It is important to keep the lines of communication open between Washington and Beijing.

Although some experts may argue that Africa has lost its strategic value, potential for future regional conflict may make it advisable to have access to military facilities, with port calls and visit rights. Without cooperation from allies or non-allies the U.S. will not be able to meet its desire for forward deployment as set forth in the National Military Strategy.¹⁴⁵ With the Chinese attempting to procure a aircraft carrier and SU-27 Aircraft (capable of inflight refueling) from the former Soviet Union, it is wise to keep our security options open in the African region.¹⁴⁶

If the United States chooses to ignore totally the development and aspirations of Africa, it could very well find itself "on the outside looking in" on a region that has great future potential.

For its own good, the United States should monitor China-Africa relations very carefully. It would be inexcusable to lose the support and goodwill of these important parts of the world simply because of carelessness or neglect.

¹⁴⁵*National Military Strategy of the United States*, January 1992, p. 11.

¹⁴⁶WuDunn, Cheryl. *China Browses for Tanks, Aircraft and Carriers in Ex-Soviet Lands*, New York Times, 7 June 1992, p. A15.

APPENDIX A. TIME LINE 1949-1992

CHINA/AFRICA/UNITED STATES

1949

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
<p>Fall of Nanjing and Beijing Chiang Kai-Shek resigns Nationalists withdraw to island of Formosa (Taiwan) PRC assumes power, Mao Tse-Tung (Chairman), Zhou En Lai (Premier/Foreign minister) UN General Assembly asks members to respect sovereignty of China PRC demands ouster of KMT. PRC recognized by USSR, Eastern Europe PRC seizes all American assets</p>	<p>Race riots in South Africa Apartheid instituted Libya granted independence</p>	<p>Truman begins second term Dean Acheson becomes Secretary of State Secretary of State Forrestal resigns—succeeded by Louis A. Johnson Formation of NATO DOD and JCS established Mutual Defense Assistance Act U.S. issued a White Paper: All Aid to Nationalist China Cess.</p>

1950

<p>30-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance w/USSR signed Invasion of Tibet PRC "volunteers" intervened in the Korean War U.S. recognizes PRC Mao criticizes South African discriminatory and anti-Communist policies</p>	<p>Group Areas bill enacted in South Africa Eritrea reunited with Ethiopia New constitution in Nigeria</p>	<p>U.S. authorizes continuance of H-bomb development Sen. Joe McCarthy Communist "witch hunt" proved unjustified Internal Security Bill Korean War U.S.-led embargo on PRC</p>
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1951

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
<p>Tibet Agreement PRC opposes rearmament of PRC Language and education reforms Abstention on U.N. resolution criticizing Egypt's restrictions on Suez Canal</p>	<p>U.N. Trusteeship criticizes South Africa (southwest Africa) Sudan rejects unification with Egypt Egypt restricts shipping in Suez Canal</p>	<p>Truman declares that U.S. would not bomb China U.S. sends arms to Taiwan John Foster Dulles attempts to dissuade Britain from allowing PRC participation in Japan Peace Treaty Proposal of Joint Middle East Command with U.K. and France</p>

1952

PRC and USSR end joint administration of Changchun Railway	Anti-French riots in Tangier Anti-British riots in Egypt Non-White campaign in South Africa Anti-British May Insurrection in Kenya Britain formally transfers Eritrea to Ethiopia Anti-French riots in Tunisia Military coup in Egypt, King Farouk abdicates Egypt signs independence agreement with Sudan	Japanese Peace Treaty ratified (ANZUS) McCarran-Water Immigration and Nationality Act Eisenhower elected President John Foster Dulles becomes Secretary of State
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1953

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
5-Year Plan initiative PRC announces aid program aimed at developing, with USSR, heavy industry Geneva Conference China-Islam Association formed	Zambia united with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (and Malawi) become Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Engagement of Public Safety legislation in South Africa Mau Mau insurrection (cont) Sudan votes for complete independence from Egypt	Japan occupation ends U.S. ROK Treaty signed Geneva Conference on Ind-China
Walter Sisulu: Secretary General of African National Congress (ANC) visits China		

1954

5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence initiated First National Peoples Congress and state constitution	Prime Minister Malan retires in South Africa Nigeria achieved self-government	H-bomb testing in Marshall Islands Potomac Charter, U.S. and U.K.
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1955

PRC and Taiwan battle in Taiwan Straits	Egypt-Czech arms deal	Pres. Eisenhower asks for authorization to defend Taiwan
Banding Conference attended by 29 states, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana (Gold Coast), Liberia, Libya and Sudan attend banding PRC Egypt trade deal		

1956

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Ban on U.S. news reporters lifted Eighth Party Congress Denial of U.N. seat Missile development commences	Tangiers unites with Morocco Togo declared autonomous republic Sudan gains autonomy and joins Arab League Somalia elects first premier Abdullah Issa Morocco gains independence Tunisia gains independence	First airborne H-bomb exploded U.S. supplies Israel with arms U.S. denies arms to Egypt U.S. denies aid for Aswan Dam Eisenhower re-elected
Egypt recognizes PRC, establishes relations		
	Gamal Nasser elected President of Egypt Egypt nationalizes Suez to pay for Aswan Dam; gains complete control	
China endorses Egyptian actions at Suez and offers volunteers to assist in running canal		
Establishment of West Asian and African Affairs Department (foreign ministry)		

1957

Mao's Hundred Flowers Campaign commences Pinyin language developed	Gold Coast and British Togoland become Ghana after gaining independence. Kwama N. Nkrumah becomes prime minister. Abubakr Tafawa Balewa becomes first prime minister of Nigeria France refuses to grant Algerian independence	Eisenhower Doctrine Civil Rights Commission established
Director of West Asia and Africa Affairs Kio Hua visits Ghana PRC sends aid to Algeria (FLN) PRC delegations visit Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia Asia-African Solidarity Conference		
PRC and USSR conflict on Middle Eastern and African policy	U.S. supplies Tunisia with arms despite French protest	

1958

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
5-year Plan Bombardment of Quemoy Islands Peoples communes formed Great Leap Forward Anti-Chinese demonstrations in Tibet PRC-USSR Technical Assistance Agreement	All-African Peoples Conference Mauritania gains autonomy from France Senegal gains autonomy from France Guinea gains independence from France: Sekou Toure president Mali gains autonomy from France Ivory Coast gains autonomy from France	Seventh Fleet escorts Taiwanese convoy to Quemoy U.K. decides not to support U.S. in Quemoy crisis U.S. PRC talks in Warsaw, Poland
PRC establishes relations with Morocco and Algeria		
	Dahomey declared republic French colony Ubang, Shari becomes Central African Republic French Congo gains independence and becomes Gabon Middle Congo becomes Republic of Congo Madagascar becomes semi-autonomous French Somaliland chose to remain a territory of France Tunisia clashes with French troops; joins Arab League Egypt and Syria become UAR; USSR lends 100 million for construction of Aswan Dam	

1959

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
<p>Anti-Chinese Turmoil in Tibet; Dalai Lama flees to India; calls for U.N. action vs. PRC</p> <p>USSR voice support for PRC quest for offshore islands</p> <p>PRC-Guinea sign technical agreement</p>	<p>Pres. Toure (Guinea) and Pres. Nkrumah sign agreement for a union of independent African states</p> <p>Senegal, Mali and Sudan for Mali Federation: Hodibo Keha Premier</p> <p>Upper Volta gains autonomy</p> <p>Anti-European rioting in Congo (Kinshasa)</p> <p>Bahutu uprising in Rwanda</p> <p>ANC banned in Malawi (British Nyasaland); riots followed</p>	<p>Dulles resigns as Sec. of State; Christian Herter succeeds</p> <p>Pres. Eisenhower visits Tunisia and Morocco</p> <p>Rusk: Reassesses PRC</p>
PRC establishes relations with Sudan and Guinea		
	Senegal, Fr. Sudan, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Volta and Dahomey form Customs Union	

1960

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Severe floods and droughts	African nationalism in full swing	<p>Sit-in demonstration led by martin Luther King</p> <p>Civil Rights Act of 1960</p> <p>Pres. Eisenhower visits Asia</p> <p>Polaris Missile launch</p> <p>John Fitzgerald Kennedy elected president</p>
Second Afro-Asian People Solidarity Organization Conference (AAPSO)		
USSR technician withdraw from PRC; relations strained	<p>Mauritania becomes and independent Islamic republic; Moktar Ould, president</p> <p>Senegal withdrawn from Mali Republic</p> <p>Guinea leaves France Zone and accepts USSR economic aid</p>	<p>Sit-in demonstration led by martin Luther King</p> <p>Civil Rights Act of 1960</p> <p>Pres. Eisenhower visits Asia</p> <p>Polaris Missile launch</p> <p>John Fitzgerald Kennedy elected president</p>

1960 (continued)

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
China-Africa People's Friendship Association (CAPFA) established PRC gives economic aid to Guinea		
	Upper Volta gains full independence	
	U.S. forces evaluation of base at Ben Simane (Morocco)	
PRC accepts Soviet proposal to transform Solidarity Council into AAPSO	Niger gains independence from France Chad gains independence; stays in Franzone Togo gains full independence from France; Sylvanus Olympio Dahomey gains full independence Nigeria gains full independence Nnamo; Azikiwe first governor-general Central Africa proclaims independence Gabon gains independence Belgian Congo becomes Independent Congo Republic; Congo Civil war/Lumumba (Congo)-Gizenga Madagascar becomes independent British and Italian Somalia reunited to form Somali Republic gaining full independence; Osman first president Aswan Dam construction	

1961

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
<p>PRC-North Korea Mutual Defense Treaty</p> <p>Countryside organized into 80,000 communes</p>	<p>Charter of Casablanca (NATO-like organization of African states) (Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and UAR)</p> <p>USSR vetoes Mauritania's membership to U.N.</p>	<p>Peace Corps established</p> <p>Freedom rides</p> <p>Bay of Pigs</p> <p>Berlin Wall</p> <p>First U.S. space flight</p>
<p>PRC establishes relations with Congo, Tanganyika</p> <p>AAPSO (Afro-Asian People Solidarity Organization)</p> <p>Establishes Aid Committee to Algeria and Congo, PRC vice-chair</p>		
<p>PRC mission in Congo closed at insistence of Adoula</p>	<p>Sierra Leone becomes independent state</p> <p>Dahomey seizes Ajuda</p> <p>Northern Cameroon unites with Nigeria</p> <p>Ex-Premier Lamumba of Congo assassinated; USSR accuses U.N. Secretary Hammarskjold; Adoula-Gizenga reconciled</p> <p>Insurgency in Angola begins</p> <p>Rwanda proclaimed a republic</p> <p>Burundi petition U.N. for independence</p> <p>South Africa severs ties with U.K.; becomes republic</p> <p>Tanzania granted independence; Pres. Julius Nyrere</p> <p>Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) released from prison</p> <p>Tunisia/Algeria continue struggle with France</p> <p>Syria with draws from UAR</p>	<p>President Kennedy warns that U.S. would oppose any unilateral intervention</p>

1962

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Sino-border War Afro Asia without USSR	OAS established in Lagos, Nigeria Casablanca states and UAR boycott OAS in support of Algeria	India request aid via President Kennedy Lt. Col. John Glenn becomes first president to make orbital flight Cuban Missile Crisis
Nasser mediates Sino-India War		
Sino-Soviet rift widens PRC-Indonesia discuss plan for Afro-Asian trade Union with USSR participation PRC establishes relations with Uganda	Algerian War ends; admitted to Arab League and U.N. Rwanda: U.N. mandate terminated	President Kennedy warns that U.S. would oppose any unilateral intervention
	Congo: U.S. submits plan to persuade Tshombe to accept plan for uniting Congo states. Tshombe accepts	
Sino-Soviet rift widens PRC-Indonesia discuss plan for Afro-Asian trade Union with USSR participation PRC establishes relations with Uganda	Zambia: Kaunda's party (United National Federal Party) and ANC unite to establish African majority Malawi gains complete autonomy (Tanzania) Tanganyika becomes a republic Uganda gains independence	
PRC issue 200 of 400 African scholarships to Somalia		

1963

PRC-USSR rift widens; PRC identifies USSR as "white men" who have no right to be on African continent CCP criticizes USSR for military aid to India	Third Afro-Asian (AAPSO) Conference Cong: Tshombe flees as Katanga state is abolished Zambia secedes from Rhodesian Federation U.N. Bans military shipments to South Africa	Martin Luther King "I Have a Dream" speech John Fitzgerald Kennedy assassinated LBJ president Race riots in Birmingham Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Hotline (communication link) established with USSR
Zhou En-Lai begins Africa tour to 10 African states		
PRC loans Algeria 17 million dollars PRC refuses to sign Test Ban Treaty	Zanzibar granted self-government by British Jomo Kenyatta elected Prime Minister of Kenya Algeria-Moroccan War	

1964

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Zhou En-Lai continues visits to UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Rhodesia		Aid terminated to ROC Civil Rights Bill LBJ is elected Race riots in Harlem, Jersey City Warren Commission report (John Fitzgerald Kennedy) findings
PRC signs Treaty with Yemen Zhou En-Lai visits Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon PRC and USSR discuss border disputes/convocation of World Congress of Communist Parties Tibet gains autonomy Zhou En-Lai visits Moscow	First meeting of Organization of African Unity (Cairo) Boycott Portugal and South Africa Ghana voice support for Zhou En-Lai's Anti-imperialist Conference Mozambique Revolution against Portugal Federation of Rhodesia dissolved Nelson Mandela imprisoned in South Africa Tanganyika and Zanzibar merge to become Tanzania	
PRC establishes relations with Zanzibar, Kenya, Burundi		
PRC loans Algeria 17 million dollars PRC refuses to sign Test Ban Treaty	Kenya becomes on-party republic (Kenyatta) Sudan depots 300 missionaries USSR supports Somalia in war with Kenya and Ethiopia	
Preparatory meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference (Djakarta); PRC attempts to exclude USSR from conference scheduled for 1965 World Federation of Scientific Workers participants urged to present "broad united front against U.S. imperialism in Vietnam"		
	First stage of Aswan Dam completed	

1965

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Cultural Revolution (GPCR) PRC-Kuwait Trade Agreement	Third meeting of OAU Collapse of Second Banding Conference Gambia gains independence Ghana severs ties with Rhodesia	Civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery Malcolm X assassinated Voting Rights Act Higher Education Act
PRC-Congo sign 10 year Treaty of Friendship		
Tibet announces autonomy	Tanzania becomes one party state Afro-Asian Islamic Conference at Casablanca	Vietnam involvement intensifies American Embassy bombed in Saigon
PRC offers to build Tan-Zam Railway; preliminary team begins survey		
Lin Rao's "Long live the victory of People's War"	Tanzania severs British ties; assume role as leader of Anticolonialism and African liberation	

1966

Third 5-year Plan aborted by GPCR Formation of Red Guards PRC trade with noncommunist countries flourishes Guided missiles and nuclear tests Deng Xiaoping purged	OAU meeting at Addis Ababa; call for South African sanctions Chad-Sudan at war President Nkrumah visits Beijing; coups ensue in Ghana while on visit; reestablishes ties with British and expels PRC and USSR advisors Angola Civil War Zambia adopts 4-Year National Development Plan Rhodesian crisis Kenya: expulsion of pro-communist forces	Vietnam War protests Race riots continue in major cities President Johnson travels to Asia to solidify support for Vietnam
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1967

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Cultural Revolution continues	OAU calls for use of force to overthrow Rhodesian regime	Nonproliferation Treaty concluded Race riots in Detroit
PRC, Zambia and Tanzania sign loan agreement for Tan-Zam Railway		Anti-missile Network to counter PRC
Detonation of hydrogen bomb		Vietnam Peace March
PRC Nuclear, PRC builds hydroelectric plant in Testing (7th) Guinea		
	Arab-Israeli War (6-day War)	
Lin Rao's "Long live the victory of People's War"	President Kaunda of Zambia visits PRC Guerrillas stationed in Zambia raid Rhodesian positions Kaunda mediates cease-fire with Kenyan and Somalian leaders	Israel attacks USS Liberty Justice Thurgood Marshall confirmed to Supreme Court
PRC extends trade credit to Egypt		
PRC recognizes Yemen		

1968

Order restored, Cultural Revolution over	OAU meeting admits Swaziland and Mauritius bringing number to 42	President Johnson announces refusal to seek re-election U.S.-PRC talks in Warsaw
PRC builds railway between Mali and Guinea		Tet offensive
Detonation of hydrogen bomb		Martin Luther King assassinated Nixon elected president Civil Rights Act Sen. Robert Kennedy assassinated

1969

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
PRC and USSR border clashes Ninth Party Congress meets in secrecy (GPCR officially over)	Congo: Pres. Mobutu visits Brussels Zambia nationalizes copper mining Rhodesia severed ties with Britain	ABM debates Vietnam protest continues U.S. relaxes trade restrictions against PRC Apollo II walk on moon
PRC, Zambia and Tanzania sign loan agreement for Tan-Zam Railway		Nixon Doctrine
	Sudan coup by junior officers Eritrean Liberation Front hijacks Ethiopian Airlines	Big Four talks about Middle East

1970

PRC begins construction on Tan-Zam Railway		Anti-war protests
PRC launches satellite PRC reemerges in Africa via friendship, cultural, technical and delegations PRC becomes largest donor of aid to Africa	Rhodesian Republic proclaimed Uganda nationalized banks Kenya Kenya orders 1000 Asian businesses to close Libya—Moammar Qaddafi becomes premier; closes British and U.S. base Egypt's Nasser visits USSR; dies succeeded by Anwar Sadat	Gulf of Tonkin Resolution repealed Kent State Evacuation of U.S. troops from Cambodia Congress of African People meeting in Atlanta
	Secretary of State Rogers tours ten African countries Congo: President Mobutu visits the United States Ethiopia: Revelation of U.S. agreement which applied army	
PRC establishes relations with Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia		

1971

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
<p>Fourth 5-year Plan</p> <p>PRC launched second satellite</p> <p>Reorganization of CCP</p> <p>PRC builds nuclear sub</p> <p>Kissinger visits PRC</p> <p>PRC formally admitted to U.N.</p> <p>PRC voted into U.N. African vote 26-15; this gave them the necessary votes—26 October</p>		<p>U.S. recognizes PRC</p> <p>Pentagon Papers (CBC)</p> <p>Congressional Black Caucus forms submits 61 recommendations which included Africa</p> <p>South Africa Sugar Acts</p> <p>Rep. Diggs walkout on U.N. vote on Apartheid; later resigns</p> <p>Nixon visits USSR</p> <p>ABN and SALT II Treaties</p> <p>Watergate</p> <p>Nixon reelected</p>
PRC establishes relations with Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone		

1972

PRC-US communiqué		Nixon visits PRC
The teaching of Confucius discredited		Nixon visits USSR
	Zambia: CBC holds first press conference in Africa pledged support and deep affinity between African Americans and Africans	
PRC purchases US wheat		<p>Watergate</p> <p>Nixon reelected</p> <p>First African American Conference</p> <p>CBC issues "Black Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights; RT Africa</p>
PRC establishes relations with Chad, Malagasi Republic, Mauritius, Togo, Zaire		

1973

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
10th Party Congress Birth Control Campaign France President visits PRC PRC goes on force alert in response to USSR activity Deng Xiaoping reemerges under patronage of Zhou En-Lai PRC trade for western technology increases	Arab-Israeli War	Withdrawal from Vietnam Kissinger becomes Secretary of State USSR threatens to intervene in CBC issues "the true state of the union overview" in response to Nixon's State of the Union address Oil crises: OPEC raises prices 300%
PRC establishes relations with Upper Volta		

1974

Deng admitted to Politburo Deng Xiaoping visits UN; expands upon Three World Theory PRC-Japan MFN	Portuguese overthrown in Angola	Nixon resigns; Ford becomes new president
PRC establishes relations with Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger		

1975

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Fourth National People's Congress; 1975 State Constitution; four modernizations; 1975 State Constitution PRC-EEC relations Deng Xiaoping visits France PRC increases exports to Kuwait	Cuba sends troops to Angola	Reduces ROC forces Suspension of aid to Israel USS Mayaguez incident
PRC, Zambia and Tanzania complete for Tan-Zam Railway (TAZARA)		President Ford visits PRC
PRC's Third satellite		CBC meets with Kissinger to discuss US-Africa policy
PRC establishes relations with Botswana, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique		

1976

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
Fifth 5-year Plan Death of Zhou En-Lai; succeeded by Hua Guofeng Deng purged again Mao Zedong dead Gang of Four purged	Libya, Egypt border clash Abrogation of Egyptian- USSR treaty; strained relations	Vietnam reunited Carter is elected president; CBC drafts African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa
Egyptian delegation visits PRC culminating in arms deal		
PRC Muslims make Hajj to Mecca		
PRC establishes relations with Cape Verde, Seychelles		

1977

Deng in power 11th Party Congress PRC becomes third largest spender on arms behind U.S. and USSR	Cuban troops in Ethiopia Egypt cools relations with USSR; border clashes with Libya; Sadat visits Israel	Carter Doctrine CBC initiates Brain Trust system Andrew Young is U.N. ambassador Transafrica (African- American lobby established)
	Arms embargo to South Africa; Carter addresses U.N. Death of Steven Biko in South Africa First Anti-apartheid resolution (HCR 388)	
PRC establishes relations with Liberia		

1978

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
5th National People's Congress PRC steps up anti-USSR rhetoric 1st 10-year Plan PRC-EEC sign 5-year trade agreement		Nonproliferation Act EEC begins European Money System Carter okays sale of arms and U.S. technology to PRC 1st PRC-US student exchange resume
Sadat visits PRC		
PRC-Japan sign 20b trade agreement USSR request talks to improve PRC relations; PRC refuses PRC-Japan Treaty of Friendship PRC supports Camp David talks Missile purchase from France PRC-Taiwan reproachment		
PRC establishes relations with Libya		

1979

PRC normalizes relations with U.S. PRC clashes with Vietnam PRC to participate in Olympics Successful ballistic missile test Request USSR pull out of Afghanistan		US-PRC normalize relations U.S.-Philippines 5-year base agreement SALT II negotiations U.S. cut aid to Pakistan because of nuclear development Three Mile Island Authorization of MX missile Andrew Young resigns as U.N. ambassador Deng visits Shah harbored in New York. Iran hostage crisis
PRC establishes relations with Djibouti		

1980

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
	Base agreement with Kenya, Somalia and Oman	
6th National Congress; Zhao Ziyang becomes premier PRC and U.S. coordinate aid for Majahidin via Pakistan PRC primary arms supplier for Pakistan Successful test of CSSX-4 ICBM Gang of Four trial	Israel-South Africa nuclear test	U.S. sells weapons to PRC and ROC USSR grain embargo Refugee ceiling 50,000 Iran hostage failed rescue attempt Vance resigns; succeeded by Muskie Boycott of Olympics Computer sale to PRC Reagan elected; A. Haig Sec of State
	Congressmen Gray and Solarz visit South Africa	

1981

Iran delegation visits PRC process Third World membership 6th 5-year Plan Trade surplus 6.1 billion with other Third World countries PRC resumes Third World rhetoric PRC-ROC reunification rejected PRC launches three satellites	Egypt (Sadat) expels 1,000 Soviets; Sadat assassinated; Mubarak succeeds	RDF formed Pope shot Haig: Reaffirms arms sales; has strategic imperative U.S. neutron bomb production Sandra Day O'Connor first female Supreme Court Justice Trident sub launched
	U.S.-Egypt 20 accord for two nuclear power plants	
		CBC calls for dismissal of Jean Kirkpatrick for meeting with South African military officers
	U.S. vetoes U.N. council resolution condemning South Africa for invading Angola	

1982

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
PRC announces independent foreign policy, pragmatic ideology PRC proposal for arms control at U.N. meeting PRC-US 5-year textile agreement 12th Party Congress PRC-U.S. discuss development of nuclear industry PRC-U.K. talks on H.K. begin 1st submarine missile launched.	Zaire renews relations with Israel	Shultz becomes Sec of State Falklands War Suspension of PRC nuclear program
CBC attempts to block IMF loan to South Africa		

1983

PRC high tech revolution sweeping world	Zhao Ziyang on Today. Visit to Africa; cancel 100 million debt to Zaire Israel-Zaire 5-year Military Cooperation Agreement	Reagan "evil empire" speech SDI research begins DC government divests in South Africa U.S. embassy in Beirut and USMC barracks bombed Navy shells Druze positions U.S.-Grenada invasion SECDEF Weinberger visits PRC
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1984

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
PRC endorses Middle East conference PRC-U.S. increase trade agreements Zhao Ziyang visits U.S. as well as defense minister	IMF approved 359.6 million in loans to Zaire	Navy shells Lebanon Deployment of Cruise missiles
	CBC calls for release of Nelson Mandela; escalation of student protest	
Reagan visits PRC; sign Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Launch of first satellite Statement in support of global peace based on five principles PRC-U.K. agree on Hong Kong Arab countries consider PRC as prime market investment Jordanian contract to build four nuclear plants in PRC	U.N. supports military aid to Angola against South African aggression U.S. lifts ban on Mozambique South African forces withdraw from Angola Morocco/Libya sign accord merging the two states Desmond Tutu wins Nobel Prize France/Libya announce Chad withdrawal OAU holds annual conference in Addis Ababa	Free South Africa protests Reagan denounces apartheid
	Rev. Tutu of South Africa meets with President Reagan	

1985

Trade delegation to Jordan Kuwait oil minister Educational reform 7th 5-year Plan; National Party Congress Arab-PRC Investment Conference	Race riots in Eastern Cape of South Africa Israel Airlift Ethiopian Jews Riots in Sudan 80 Asian African countries meet in Bamdung, Indonesia to mark 30th anniversary of Asia Africa Conference Sudan accepts military aid from Libya	New Zealand refuses port visit for U.S. nuclear ship ASW sales to PRC Sale of reactors and nonmilitary technology
	South Africa sanctions legislation introduced by Rep. Gray and Deluns	
	Julius Nyrere steps down as president of Tanzania South Africans cross Angola for preemptive strike against SWAPO-guerrillas Pope John Paul visits Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Zaire, Kenya, Morocco	Walker spy scandal; Pollard spy scandal Gramm-Rudman Bill Anti-apartheid Act Anti-apartheid march
	President Reagan signs 1 million in aid to Mozambique Chase Manhattan Bank suspends credit to South Africa	

1986

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
PRC has relations with over 120 countries Becomes 47th member of Asian Bank	(Israel) Peres to Cameroon	Explosion of Challenger U.S. raid on Libya Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
African student protest in Beijing Egypt-PRC create Islamic Bank		President Reagan vetoes Antiapartheid Act, veto is overridden by both House and Senate. Sanctions follow
Student protests for democratic reforms Central Committee reaffirms policy of economic reforms		Navy ships visit China Nakasone insult: Minority reduce U.S. IQ Reykjavik Summit

1987

PRC negotiation to launch Iranian satellite Hu Yaobang resigns Li Peng: PRC will not pull back partial economic reforms PRC-Portugal: return of Macao (1999) PRC increases troops on India borders PRC permanent outposts in Spratley Islands PRC refuses diplomatic relations because of aggressive foreign policy U.S. withholds sales of high tech items due to silkworm sales 13th Party Congress; Deng retires; Zhao Ziyang elected (General Secretary) Li Peng appointed premier	South Commission established headed by Julius Nyrere; PRC donated 400,000 75 Israeli engineers work on Cavi project in South Africa	U.S.-Mongolia relations Presidential report on Apartheid Flagging of Kuwaiti tankers in Persian Gulf USS Stark attacked by two missiles (Iraq Exocets) Citicorp loses 14.7 billion in Third World loans U.S. cancels support for Israel Lavi aircraft IMF treaty Black Monday (Wall Street)
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1988

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
PRC Navy power projects in Spratley Islands Long-term leases near Shanghai Tibet unrest Sale of MR missiles to Saudi Arabia PRC-Vietnam clash in Spratleys Li Peng calls for economic reforms Pakistan Test PRC announces steps to control inflation of 20-50%	Kenya renews relations with Israel	Noriega indictment Secstate Schultz Peace Plan USS Roberts strikes mine USS Vincennes shoots down Iran airline Bush elected; Baker Secretary of State
PRC students demonstrate against African students		

1989

Increased military ties with Pakistan, Iran, Saudis Ties renewed with Indonesia Tibet unrest PRC premier visits Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi Sino-Soviet Summit Tiennamen Square; Zhao Ziyang purged; Jing Zemin named General Secretary PRC warns Eastern Europe against political changes PRC solidifies economic ties with Kuwait PRC voices concern to USSR over E. Europe events	Central African review ties with Israel S. African test new missile with Israeli's Ethiopia renews ties with Israel Yang Shamkun visits UAE, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman Egypt renews relations with Syria Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jamahiriya and Mauritania form Union of Arab Maghreb Through President Carter's mediation Ethiopian government enters into provisional negotiations	Bush visits PRC US jets shoot down Lybian fighter Milken fiasco affecting world markets EXXON oil spill Oliver North convicted on Iran-Contra scandal PRC Sanctions for Tiennamen Brent Scroncroft secretary visits PRC U.S. approves PRC satellite purchases San Francisco Quake Berlin Wall falls; Germany reunited Haig visits PRC
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1990

CHINA	AFRICA	UNITED STATES
<p>PRC builds warships</p> <p>PRC requests foreign aid to combat pollution</p> <p>PRC-USSR military exchange visits</p> <p>Arrest of Non official Christian leaders</p> <p>Formation of new Hong Kong constitution</p> <p>Ethnic unrest in Xingiang</p> <p>PRC renews Fulbright Program</p> <p>Launch of commercial satellites (27th)</p> <p>Li Peng visits Moscow</p> <p>Renewal of ties to Mongolia</p> <p>Reemphasis on birth control</p> <p>Yang Shingkun visits Latin America</p> <p>Taiwan offers reunification proposal</p> <p>Schmidt in Beijing</p> <p>USSR delegation visit</p> <p>Establishment of future markets with assistance from Chicago Board of Trade</p> <p>PRC strengthens ties with Saudis</p> <p>PRC Singapore discuss relations</p> <p>Li Peng visits Indonesia and Singapore</p> <p>PRC allows foreign firms to sue</p> <p>PRC wants to open stock market</p> <p>First nuclear war exercises</p> <p>Asian Games</p> <p>Supports Taiwan vs. Japan over Ryukyu</p>	<p>Ethiopia denies plan to direct Nile with Israeli assistance</p> <p>South Commission results published</p> <p>Mubarak visits PRC</p> <p>Liberia: Civil War Charles murdered</p> <p>Completion of South Commission report; PRC donated 400,000</p> <p>Chad: Hissene Habre; fled</p> <p>Nelson Mandela released from prison</p> <p>Nelson Mandela visits U.S. and other nations</p> <p>Mozambique: Frelino government makes contact with Renamo</p> <p>Namibia gains independence</p>	<p>Executive order allows PRC students to remain in U.S.</p> <p>Pres. Bush renewed Most Favored Nation status much to consternation of Congress</p> <p>Vice Pres. Quayle meets with Chai Ling (PRC dissident) in White House</p> <p>U.S. named second largest arms exporter</p> <p>Iraq invades Kuwait. Beginning of troop buildup</p> <p>President Bush visits troops</p> <p>U.S. writes off 7 billion dollar Egyptian debt</p> <p>Suspension of aid to Pakistan due to nuclear weapon research</p> <p>Begin exit of Philippine bases</p> <p>Bush/Gorbachev summit</p> <p>Five U.S. congressmen hosted in PRC</p>

1991

CHINA	AFRICA	US
<p>Kuwaiti emir visits Beijing</p> <p>Tienanmen activists receive jail sentence</p> <p>confer with Iraqis about Soviet peace proposal</p> <p>4th Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on 25 March 1991</p>	<p>Gulf War; Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda mediates secures release of British hostages</p> <p>Several African rulers fell from power:</p> <p>Ethiopia: Mengistu Haile Mariam</p> <p>Lesotho: Metsing Lekhanya</p> <p>Mali: Moussa Traore</p> <p>Benin: Matthieu Kerekou</p> <p>Bape Verde: Aristides Pereira</p> <p>Somalia: Siyad Barre</p> <p>São Tomé: Pinto da Costa</p> <p>18,000 Ethiopian Jews airlifted by Israel</p> <p>Winnie Mandela trial/conviction</p> <p>Kampala leadership forum</p> <p>BCCI scandal</p> <p>Zambia: Kaunda voted out after 26 years, Frederick Chiluba</p> <p>Angola peace treaty imminent</p> <p>EC reports 30M Africans affected by war and famine</p> <p>Namibia gains independence: visits PRC</p>	<p>Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm</p> <p>Baker visits Middle East</p> <p>President Bush lifts economic sanctions in South Africa</p> <p>Bush extends Most Favored Nation status to PRC without conditions</p>
PRC break off relations with Central African Republic after C.A.R. resumed relations with Taiwan		
	African leaders sign treaty to develop economic common market	

1992

Chinese foreign minister Quian Quichen tours six-country African tour: Mali, Guinea, Senegal, La Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Namibia		
<p>Israel accused of transferring patriot missile technology to China</p> <p>5th Session of the 7th National People's Congress 20 March 1992</p>	<p>Referendum on Reform passes in S. Africa 68-7 voted yes</p>	<p>Los Angeles riots after Los Angeles after a jury acquits the police officers who beat Rodney King. Unrest reported in cities across the United States</p>

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